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This study examines the status of the Qur)an in contemporary Islamic thought at the 
point of intersection with the philosophical discourses of modernity and 
postmodernity. As a marginal discourse, Islamic thought has had to seek legitimacy in 
light of the dominant paradigms of modernity and postmodernity. It is argued that 
through active engagement and critique of the dominant paradigms, Islamic discourse 
is able to articulate a much more vivid portrait of its authentic-self. This self-portrait 
is shaped by dissenting voices within the Western philosophical tradition critical of 
modernity and postmodernity, as well as by voices from the Islamic intellectual 
tradition. The role of the Qur)an as foundational text is approached by questioning the 
status and source of values in both the Western and the Islamic traditions. It is 
consequently argued that the moral categories of right and wrong, or good and bad, 
are necessarily ontological in Islam and are informed by the Qur)an. The role of the 
Qur)an as foundational text is thus affirmed from this perspective. Finally, the 
mechanism through which the Qur)an is able to convey its ethical imperative is 
explored. In this regard, it is argued that the Qur)an is performative in nature and that 
its moral ethos is conveyed by a dialogic process. The conclusion suggests that the re-
emergence of a religious slant in social discourse is of marked significance, especially 
at a time in which secular philosophy is being cogently challenged. This study is 
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When a person utters the creedal statement of Islam - bearing witness that there is no 
Divinity except God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God - he has essentially 
done two things. Firstly, he has rooted his existence and being in terms of an external 
locus to whose authority he submits. Secondly, he has laid claim to a certain belief 
that he holds to be true. The ontological consciousness of the individual, in the first 
instance, ultimately rests on faith. His sense of being undoubtedly impacts upon every 
aspect of his life but he is at liberty to determine what he chooses to believe simply on 
whim or fancy. However, at some point or another he is required to justify his beliefs 
for himself and for others. He has to furnish proof for that which he holds to be true. 
Therefore, even faith ('lman) rests upon the bedrock of knowledge «'Um). 
Far from being the innocent godchild of faith, knowledge in itself is a complicated 
enterprise. Epistemology, one of the most prominent branches of philosophy, solely 
concerns itself with the nature, sources, limits and justifications of what comprises 
knowledge and what does not. Ontology (sense of being) and epistemology 
Oustification of being) are two branches of philosophy that are inextricably linked. 
For a Muslim, this becomes most evident when pondering over the Qur'an. In the 
ontological sense, the Qur'an is the transcendental voice that constantly engages the 
believer in a manner that convinces him to act in accordance with its directives. In the 












While the ontological status of the Qur'an can hardly be questionable for the believer, 
resting - as it does - on faith, its epistemological status most certainly can (and has 
been) questioned. Scholars from within and beyond the fold of Islam have posed 
vexing questions concerning the nature and status of the Qur'an. Those within the 
Islamic camp have debated the epistemological status of the Qur'an from a very early 
stage in Muslim history. The perennial question proffered in this regard is whether 
revelation is to be given primacy over reason, or whether reason reigns supreme. In 
more recent times scholars have raised issues around the historicity of the text. A 
typical argument of this type suggests that the Qur'an is a product of a certain socio-
historical milieu accorded divine status for the purpose of political expediency. As 
such, any knowledge claims emanating from the text are hardly worth considering. 
These examples are but a sample of a broad range of inquiries that engage the Qur'an 
from an epistemological perspective. The number of contemporary studies in this 
field, in both English and Arabic, has shown a steady increase. 1 To deny the validity 
of the Qur'an as an epistemological category is tantamount to subverting not only its 
authority but its ontological status as well, because mere belief without justification is 
no more than wishful fantasy. This is perhaps one compelling reason explaining why 
greater attention has been accorded to epistemological concerns. 
In contrast, very sparse attention has been paid to the study of the Qur'anic 
phenomenon from an ontological perspective. This is therefore one of the problems 
that this study will address. Focusing upon the reception of the Qur'an by Muslims as 
beings-in-the-world, ontologically that is, presents a far more accurate benchmark of 
how Islam as an ideal is reconciled with the challenges of lived experience. 











between the 'Islam that is' and the 'Islam that ought to be" is occupied by influences 
that transform the conscientious affirmation and expression of authentic Islam into an 
existential endeavour, always in flux. Some of these influences are potentially 
subversive and serve to undermine the very basis of religion, while others act as 
catalysts to stimulate positive engagement with Islam in a vibrant way. The most 
powerful of these influences in the present age have been the philosophical discourses 
of modernity and postmodernity. 
The encounter between Islam, modernity, and postmodernity has without a doubt 
influenced the way in which Muslims give expression to their religion, but more 
intimately, it has also shaped the way in which they have responded to and received 
the Qur'lIn. These influences cannot be construed of in exclusively negative terms. 
The challenges that Muslims have faced in engaging the Qur'lIn before Islam's 
encounter with modernity have indeed been many. The most positive development 
arising out of the encounter between Islamic thought and the discourses of modernity 
and postmodernity has been the impetus provided for deep introspection. In brief, 
these are the main concerns that will be addressed in this study and which must now 
be explicitly articulated. 
1. Aims and Objectives 
This study proposes to analyse the position and status of the Qur'an with reference to 
the philosophical discourses of modernity and postmodernity. More specifically, it 
aims to address the engagement between modernity, postmodernity, and 
contemporary Islamic thought so as to examine how this has influenced the re-











provide valuable insight into how Muslims reconcile the challenge of remaining 
faithful to beliefs held to be eternally valid - and which are contained in the Qur'an -
and the demands of a world constantly in motion. 
Before proceeding further, something must be said about the notion of the 
foundational text, a metaphor that applies specifically to the discourses of Islam and 
modernity. Modernist discourse has been strongly equated with the philosophical 
doctrine of foundationalism, which argues that knowledge is ultimately based on 
beliefs that require no further justification.2 These foundational beliefs have been 
taken as those that are certain and beyond doubt. Consequently, the Qur'an fits the 
description of foundational text (from an Islamic perspective) because it is accorded 
infallible status due to its divine origins. Modernist discourse, in contrast, has 
accorded the status of foundational text to reason, because it is the faculty that 
determines the logical truths that require no further justification. 
Postmodernism, on the other hand, is best described as anti-foundationalist. This is a 
broad term used to describe a discourse that problematizes absolute categorisations. 
Anti-foundationalism would favour relativism over absolute truth or scepticism over 
claims of objectivity. Islamic discourse, like modernist discourse, not only accepts, 
but also presupposes the existence of basic self-evident truths or universal proposals. 
The foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate covers a very broad spectrum in 
philosophical literature but will be used in this study in the manner just described, and 












Although the central focus of this study is the Qur'an, the approach adopted is one 
that focuses on the theoretical concerns that address the way in which the Qur'an has 
been conceived of and received. As such, not much reference is made to the contents 
of the Qur'an itself, and it is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with its 
basic teachings and themes. 
Another prominent feature of the study is that it addresses many issues that are 
normally associated with the study of philosophy. This has necessitated explaining 
some of the philosophical arguments in detail, which sometimes required taking 
recourse to extensive quotes. The advantage of using direct quotes over paraphrasing 
is that it conveys the subtlety of the view being argued without the risk of 
misappropriating the author's intent. 
A final consideration to bear in mind is that even though the study at times seriously 
engages contemporary debates in philosophy, these debates are not the central focus 
of what is being argued and the reader unfamiliar with the current literature in the 
field may inadvertently be disadvantaged. In contrast, the specialist in the field of 
philosophy might find some of the argumentation laborious. This is unfortunately the 
consequence of having to straddle two very distinct disciplines. 
3. The Importance of the Study 
This study is seen as contributing towards the reconstruction of Islamic thought within 
a contemporary paradigm. This is attempted by expressing the philosophical 











doing so, this paradigm can be measured by interrogating it with opposing paradigms 
articulated in the same language. 
The study is, as such, of considerable importance because it facilitates dialogue 
between classical and contemporary paradigms by expressing the old in terms of the 
new. This importance is twofold, impacting upon both theory and praxis. 
Theoretically, it establishes new horizons of understanding by transcending classical 
paradigms. Practically, this new understanding is ultimately manifested in the way 
people live and practice their faith. 
The emphasis that the study places upon ontology is also of importance. The study 
thereby provides us with tools for the analysis of metanarratives by extracting and 
isolating the ontological underpinnings of the thought paradigms under focus. In other 
words, the study exposes the methodologies that are used for the production of these 
particular discourses. This not only sheds clearer light upon the Western philosophical 
tradition, but upon Islamic thought as well. 
4. A Brief Overview 
The first chapter of the study will examine the encounter between Islam, modernity 
and postmodernity and should serve as an important precursor to the chapters 
thereafter. 
In chapter two an attempt will be made to identify the essential underpinnings of the 
Islamic paradigm, in contrast with the dominant Western-secular paradigm that serves 











In chapter three, attention will be given to analysing the impact of these various 
influences upon the reception of the Qur'an by Muslims living in a modern and ever-
changing world. 
The general conclusion that folJows will attempt to tie together the various aspects of 
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Cogito Ergo Sum (I think, therefore I am) - Rene' Descartes 1 
11 n ya pas de hors texte (There exists nothing outside of texts) - Jacques Derrida1 
Islam and human nature emanate from one niche. He who has created Humanity has 
also revealed to them the Qur'iin - Sbeikb Racbid aI-Gbannoucbi3 
1. Introduction 
Religious prophecies, revolutionary systems of thought, even strange ideas, all seem destined 
to find expression within the social collective, influencing the way people live, die, and 
interact. Ideas sometimes wreak havoc in the societies in which they take root. At other times 
they act as agents of tremendous enlightenment and change. Islamic thought is characterised 
by many such high and low points. The three opening epigraphs aptly reflect this and may be 
viewed as signposts marking the fault lines on the current intellectual landscape of Islam. 
Descartes is widely acknowledged as the father of modernity, while Derrida is acclaimed as 
one of the infante terrible of postmodernity. In contemporary times, al-Ghannouchi speaks in 
the name of resurgent Islam striving to reclaim its authenticity. 
In this chapter I will outline how current Islamic thought has been impacted upon by the 
intellectual discourses of modernity and postmodernity. I will proceed from the inception of 
modernity and go on to discuss developments in the postmodern period. In my final analysis I 
will discuss contemporary Islamic thought and the discontents of modernity and 











thinkers who have responded to the intellectual challenges of modernity and postmodernity. 
These thinkers strive to assert the superiority of the Islamic alternative over the dominant 
Western-secular discourses. The Secular / Islamist polemic is an essential contributing factor 
to the emergence of a clearer conception of Islamic identity in current times. The issue of 
identity will be sufficiently addressed in the next chapter, but attention must now be turned to 
the philosophical discourses of modernity and postmodernity, in order to lay the necessary 
groundwork. 
2. Islamic Thought and Modernity 
Before considering the relationship between Islamic thought and modernity, it is important to 
briefly survey the background that gave rise to modernity. This should place us in a position 
to satisfactorily appreciate the aspirations and disappointments invoked by this important 
paradigm of thought. 
2.1 The rise o/modernity in the West 
It is generally contended that the roots of Modernity as a philosophical discourse can be 
traced back to the period of the Enlightenment. In the Middle Ages, prior to the 
Enlightenment, Europe was gripped in the clutches of an intense struggle between science 
and religion. The discoveries of great figures like Kepler, Copernicus, Gilbert and Galileo 
provided a basis on which to challenge traditional religious worldviews concerning the nature 
of the universe. The price paid for challenging religious cosmological doctrines was very 
high. Galileo, for example, faced persecution for positing scientific theories that ran contrary 
to the religious dogma of the Catholic Church.4 However, the changing tides ensured that the 











The Enlightenment marked a decisive epistemological break from the thought paradigm of 
the Middle Ages. The Christian Church's hegemony over institutions of knowledge and its 
power to determine the very nature of knowledge was now being challenged. The central role 
of religious ideas in politics was also brought into question. The Enlightenment thus emerged 
as a "critique of the social systems and philosophical traditions which characterised the 
Middle Ages".s Within the broader spectrum of world history these changes were as 
significant as the classical Graeco-Roman outlook (which flourished up to the fourth century 
AD) and the triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empire. The emergent Christian 
worldview replaced the Graeco-Roman outlook and proceeded to dominate Europe until the 
seventeenth century. 6 
With the onset of the eighteenth century modern ideas and arguments that came to the fore 
shifted the focus of the Looking Glass. Philosophers now began to openly scrutinise the 
world view of the church. The Enlightenment also became known as the age of reason 
because the philosophy of that time emphasised reason and rationality over the speculative 
theology of the church. Rationalism and empiricism were now core elements of 
epistemology, displacing speculative and theological metaphysics.7 Concepts like Reason, 
Empiricism, Science, Universalism, Progress, Individualism, Tolerance, Freedom, 
Uniformity of Human Nature, and Secularism, resonate throughout this period.s These major 
themes form the very core of philosophical modernity and are still invoked today. 
Thus, the Enlightenment removed religion as principle and base of identity and replaced it 
with reason. Human worth was now measured in terms of ethics and utility rather than creed 
and piety.9 In return for a compromise on faith, modernity was able to rekindle the 











humankind's spiritual loss with material gain. The scientific advances made in the last four 
centuries surpassed the collective efforts of every epoch preceding it. In spite of the material 
success of the Enlightenment, the philosophy that it had conceived would exact an extremely 
costly toll on humanity later on in history. The darker side of modernity shadowed a culture 
of suffering and genocide. 
2.2 The Muslim world before the Enlightenment 
Developments in the Muslim world were by no means as drastic. Foremostly, there was no 
fundamental epistemological shift from a hegemonic religious paradigm to a militantly 
rationalist one. Science, Reason and Religion co-existed in a relatively peaceful relationship. 
As early as the twelfth century the great philosopher of Islam, Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali, 
advocated the view that the best of sciences were those that combined transmitted (religious) 
knowledge with rational knowledge and where revelation is accompanied by opinion. 10 The 
kind of issues that fired controversy and accusations of heresy in the Muslim world 
concerned speculative theology and not Science. Al-Ghazali himself levelled charges of 
disbelief against Muslim philosophers on account of their denials of physical resurrection, 
God's knowledge of particulars and creation ex-nihilo. 
In terms of scientific discovery the Dark Ages of Europe were a time of illumination in the 
Muslim world. Philosophy as well as the natural sciences was pursued with vigour. Although 
the advances that were made in this period served as an important foundation for the 
European Enlightenment, there was no sharp tum upward towards great breakthroughs. 11 
Consequently, the discoveries of the West enabled it to transcend the geographic confines of 











the Islamic world were surpassed by their Western counterparts. With the onset of modernity 
history witnessed the emergence of the West as a new World Power. 
2.3 Modernity and Western hegemony 
Scientific advances in the West granted it dominance second to none. Along with material 
superiority came power, followed by a tremendous thirst for conquest. The military force of 
the West easily satiated its territorial appetite and in a relatively short period of time two-
thirds of the world was colonised by it. Military colonisation was inevitably accompanied by 
cultural invasion that proved to be far more exacting. The intellectual and cultural heritage of 
Islam - along with that of other civilisations - was forced into dormancy. 
While scholars have argued that the world had been disenchanted - freed from superstitious, 
mythical beliefs - by Western modernity, one can say with certainty that the West was 
simultaneously enchanting the rest of the world. By the late eighteenth/early nineteenth 
century the Ottoman Empire awakened to the changing world realities and embarked upon a 
systematic and comprehensive programme of modernisation. The bitter reality was that the 
newly emerging world was not that of the <ulamii; its languages were French, Italian and 
English, and its logic, idioms and methods were all equally foreign to Muslims. 12 Such 
desperate attempts at modernisation only served to emphasise the superiority of the West 
over the Muslim world. Not only did Muslims imitate the West in its methods of governance 
but it also began imbibing its very philosophy ofliving. 
The fact that Western modernity was a product of a very specific and unique experience is 
lost to such attempts at imitation. The impact of these imitative attempts is what is still being 











from without. It may be argued that this is not unique in any way and that no philosophy 
remains untouched by syncretism. However, the failure or success of such conflations 
depends entirely on whether any common ground exists between very distinct paradigms. 
Tensions are bound to arise in any endeavour that hopes to mix the unmixable. In spite of 
these tensions, there are always those who are willing to attempt such a rapprochement. Thus, 
the relationship between contemporary Islamic discourse and modernity will now be 
considered so as to gauge the impact of such attempts. 
2.4 Modernity and contemporary Islamic thought 
It is important at this point to differentiate between modernisation and modernity_ 
Modernisation refers to the introduction into society of artefacts of contemporary life such as 
new technology in transport, communication, etc. In contrast, modernity is a general term for 
the political and cultural process set in motion by integrating new ideas into society. It is a 
way of thought and living. However, modernisation is the process that normally leads to 
modernity. The beginnings of modernity are characterised by attitudes of enquiry into how 
people make choices, be they moral, personal, economic, or political. In other words, rational 
choice becomes central to modem men and women. 13 In the nineteenth century the West 
advocated and firmly believed in the inevitability of progress and the power of human 
reason. 14 The western mind set made a clear break with the past and maintained a strong 
forward-looking orientation. Ideas of God and transcendence slowly became fading 
memones. 
The attraction of modernity invoked varymg responses from Muslim intellectuals. The 
Muslim mindset, in contrast, was strongly attached to a glorious past and could not easily 











one is able to empathise with such a position. For Muslim intellectuals of the early twentieth 
century Islam still had much to offer in terms of its philosophical orientation and depth. Even 
though modernity had given the West the upper hand in terms of material progress, this was 
by no means reason enough to dismiss the Islamic worldview all together. 
This sentiment finds full expression in the thought of Jamal aI-Din al-Mghani. For al-
Mghani, Islam was foremost a belief in the transcendence of God and in reason. 16 At a very 
early stage, al-Mghani had realised that reason alone was not sufficient for humankind's 
prosperity. Although he enjoined embracing modernity, he remained weary of the strains it 
placed upon religion. His disciple Muhammad cAbduh followed a similar trajectory. cAbduh 
asked how the gap between Islam and modernity could be bridged and answered that 
Muslims had to accept the need for change based on the principles of Islam. 17 This tradition 
of engaging modernity was continued by the likes of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. More 
recent scholars like the late Muhammad al-Ghazali contended that certain elements of the 
modern West had to be accepted, but there are certain philosophical standpoints that are 
unacceptable to Islam. 18 
All the above intellectuals represent an engagement with modernity that is more or less 
critical. Such expressions were inevitably labelled fundamentalist and enjoyed little 
credibility amongst those that strongly upheld and embraced modernity. In view of the 
broader scope of social discourse voices of resurgent Islam were seen as no more than 
intellectual aberrations. A dominant Western discourse still preached the doctrine of 
modernity with full confidence. This would not continue indefinitely and the rise of 











it is imperative that we consider modernist trends within the Islamic tradition before moving 
on to discuss postmodernity and the rise of critical alternatives to modernity. 
As suggested, many Muslim scholars were willing to embrace modernity far more warmly. In 
most cases this involved making substantial adjustments to traditionally held views. I will 
consider the case of one such scholar, Bassam Tibi, in order to represent this position. There 
are naturally as many opinions on the project of modernity as there are scholars engaged in its 
study. It would be naive as such to treat the entire spectrum of discourse as homogenous and 
static. However, there are certain trends that can be assumed to be representative of a 
mainstream position. Tibi's discourse consequently emerges as a good genera) reflection on 
modernity because he assumes an overtly apologetic posture towards it. He is therefore well 
placed for the expressed purpose of drawing out the contrast between Islam and modernity. 
Tibi has published several works related to Islam and modernity. 19 For him, the European 
project of modernity is normative in terms of determining what constitutes knowledge?O He 
not only affirms the aims of the Enlightenment project but also regards them as necessary for 
progress and development. I will outline some of the philosophical implications of modernity 
and link them to Tibi's thought before going into a detailed exposition of his views. I will 
thereafter consider criticisms of this position. This should lead us to a general critique of 
modernity. 
For Tibi, modernity is a cultural project that triggered off a man-centred secular worldview 
and as such an insight into the capability of man to know and to change his social 











basis he asserts that modernity, as an epistemology, is a French achievement inspired by 
Rene' Descartes. In this regard, 
the Cartesian view of the world, as an objective entity. corresponds with man's discovery of his 
own capability to establish knowledge about the objective world. Man acts as a res cogitans - a 
thinking substance able to discover the world.22 
This epistemology entrenches the principal of subjectivity, which - in philosophical terms -
refers to individual freedom. In its form of self-consciousness, subjectivity determines all 
aspects of modem culture, in particular, modem knowledge. 23 
Descartes' epistemology impacted profoundly upon the course of knowledge. As one scholar 
explains: "The Cartesian philosophy of the cogito proclaimed the private 'I think' as the only 
possible source for truth and explanation after the external phenomena of the world had all 
been 'doubted' away".24 He further asserts that the '1' philosophy tradition of Descartes, Kant 
and Husserl is the primary and self-sufficient base upon which knowledge is to be founded -
primary and self-sufficient not in the way of objective things, but in the way of an 
undetermined creative source. As a result, all of these philosophers make a space for 
individual free will in their philosophies?S In this regard, Tibi is careful to point out that this 
is not an atheistic position. He argues that even Descartes acknowledges that God creates 
man but that man is able to create knowledge on his own, by his own means.26 
Therefore modernity, as described by Tibi, results in what Parvez Manzoor has described as a 
'de-divinised public order.' A natural consequence of this development is that ultimate values 
in such a social structure are political and existential as opposed to religious and trans-











this represents a shift from metaphysics to positivism. Practically, this is manifested in 
replacing belief in the presence of absolute knowledge that resides beyond human capacity 
with the pursuit of partial knowledge that could be gathered and verified through scientific 
methods. Stated differently, this is a shift from belief in an absolute truth that controlled 
human life to belief in partial scientific truths that could be used by humans to control 
nature?8 
As a result of this shift, an increasing number of social scientists consider metaphysics a 
fading religious pastime and hold that it should have been driven away from the human 
mental endeavour a long time ago. Tibi is no different and develops this orientation further, 
arguing that the only viable approach to Islam in the modern world is the sociological one?9 
Considering Tibi's emphatic and wholehearted endorsement of modernity, it comes as no 
surprise that he considers resurgent voices of Islam as being fundamentalist - in the full 
pejorative sense. He as such asserts that contemporary Muslim fundamentalists contest the 
secular knowledge based on the cultural project of modernity, as well as the worldview 
related to it.30 He bases this on his conception of modernity, which he regards as being 
composed of an institutional dimension (an idea he borrows from Anthony Giddens) as well 
as a cultural project (as held by Habermas). For Tibi these two concepts are inextricable. Any 
society wishing to make a successful transition to a modern social system needs both. The 
problem is that while the institutional dimension of modernity has been globalised, the 
cultural project has not, even though this possibility was not dismissed in the early post-
colonial period. Later however, cultural reassertion advocated the rejection of alien 
knowledge, which meant banishing cultural modernity. Tibi finds it paradoxical that in the 











endorsed. He as such refers to this phenomenon as 'the Islamic dream of semi-modernity' 
which indicates "Muslim fundamentalist ambivalence vis-a.-vis modernity and its tendency to 
split it into two components".3] 
For him the basic dilemma of contemporary Muslims with regards to their attitudes towards 
modern knowledge is that they simultaneously envisage adopting the instruments of 
modernity while rejecting its cultural underpinnings. In so doing, Tibi contends that they 
separate the achievements of modernity from the very knowledge that led to it and first made 
it possible.32 
He argues that the essence of cultural modernity is the Cartesian cogito ergo sum i.e. that 
knowledge of man stems from the doubt out of which certain human knowledge of the 
objective world grows. For him fundamentalism submits man to Allah's will whereas 
Cartesianism helps man to recognise himself as res cogitans - a thinking subject. In 
epistemological terms this translates as a shift from a religious world view to a modern 
world view. In rather prejudicial fashion Tibi thus concludes that any project - whether 
religious, postmodern or fundamentalist - that questions this world view results in 
irrationalism. 33 
Tibi would thus have us believe that the root problem with any alternative worldview lies in 
its conception of knowledge. Only modern western knowledge is normative and the 
expression of any alternative that seeks to embark 'on the de-Westernisation of knowledge' is 












Islam and all other de-Westernised sciences are not founded on the modernist principle of 
abstract subjectivity, which is the view that man is able to establish human knowledge of the 
objective world and to subject these discoveries to the pursuit of satisfying human needs. Tibi 
argues that Islamised sciences - though not traditional - are subordinated to religious 
traditions and as such do not permit the reflective posture of the Westernised sciences.35 By 
his estimation these attitudes toward modem science and technology do not contribute to the 
accommodation of modem knowledge that MusHm people urgently need for the development 
of their societies. He further holds that such attitudes reflect the beginnings of a new counter-
scientific trend in Arab culture. His biggest fear is that the politics of the Islamisation of 
knowledge could result in 'a new era offlat-earthism,.36 
Tibi further contends that the twentieth century is the age of global confrontation between 
secular cultural modernity and religious culture.37 He raises several questions that explicitly 
indicate his commitment to the secular vision of modernity. He asks why it is that Muslims 
are unable to share this view; why do they always use the fact of colonial rule to dismiss 
cultural modernity; and why do they involve the belief in Allah to disregard the ability of 
man. His explanation for all of this is that Muslim fundamentalist efforts to de-Westernise 
knowledge seeks to reverse the 'disenchantment of the world' and thus to subject man to 
supernatural powers.38 Tibi's implication is glaringly obvious: any reassertion of Islam stands 
the risk of taking us back to the Dark Ages. What is most striking about his entire argument 
is its complete endorsement of classical modernity. He seems to see very distinct similarities 
between the European Enlightenment and the current need for Islam to modernise. Just as 
Europe had freed itself from the shackles of Christianity, so too must the ArablMuslim world 











to parallel the Christian paradigm of the Middle Ages with that of Islam. At the very least, 
such an extrapolation is glaringly naive. 
Critics have pointed out several other problems with Tibi's discourse. These will very briefly 
be considered before discussing the more general critiques of the modernist project he so 
passionately endorses. One critic points out that Tibi's work presents a rather severe case of 
dichotomic thinking which caricaturises both the West and Islam. He argues that Tibi equates 
the West with modernity, which in tum is neatly lined up with Cartesianism. In a similar way 
Islam is homogenised under the heading of 'Islamic fundamentalism,.39 A more fiery 
response criticises Tibi for exhausting all his energies only to produce a one-sided indictment 
of 'Muslim fundamentalism' and offering an ill-conceived and ineptly executed apology of 
modernity. This critic goes even further, arguing that Tibi's vision of modernism is 
intellectually dated, philosophically shallow and ideologically docile.40 Even though this last 
criticism seems fully justified, it does not spare the task of responding to the claims that Tibi 
makes. The fact that Tibi chooses to subject Islam to a modernist critique justifies an 
exploration of the critiques of modernity. It is thus necessary to consider both the 
philosophical and ideological critiques raised in response to modernity. 
3. Criticisms of Modernity 
By now it should be clear that modernity has been defined in terms of beliefs and values 
identified with Enlightenment thought, relentless pursuit of progress, and control of nature for 
the wellbeing of humanity.41 These beliefs and values have been conceptualised by way of 
promises and ideals held to be lofty and true, in the most absolute sense. As such, the failure 
of these promises and the discontent of these ideals would naturally lead to crisis. The 











scholars, of which Tibi is just one example. In what follows some of the shortcomings of this 
vision will be explored. This should lead back to the philosophical underpinnings of 
modernity, which will then be critiqued. The counter-wave against modernity gave rise to 
postmodernity, which will be considered hereafter. 
3.1 Moral and socia-political trappings of the Modernist vision 
A contemporary scholar of note eloquently pronounces that "the world at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century challenges the 'wisdom' and expectations of the prophets of 
modernity" .42 Current scepticism towards modernisation and development theory challenges 
the longstanding claim that the development of modern states and societies requires 
Westernisation and secularisation.43 Although Westernisation has indeed developed and 
advanced the bureaucratic mechanisms of modern society, it has not been nearly as successful 
at eradicating the predicaments of humanity. In this regard another critic contends that the 
expression 'crisis of modernity' needs to be understood in terms of modernity'S inability to 
redeem its promise of delivering a model of perfect historical order. Explaining further, he 
emphasises that modern societies are not helpless at facing the inner challenges of 
governance and economy, which are primary determinants of the human condition in terms of 
the modernist vision, nor are modern polities vulnerable to any threats by external enemies. 
Rather, upholders of the modernist vision are perplexed by the realisation that their global 
city is not a city of humanity. 44 
A Turkish Islamist scholar lends his support to this criticism by focusing on the plight of the 
environment as well as the individual. He exclaims that although modernism had promised 
paradise on earth, it has instead turned the entire planet into a living hell. He goes further, 











polluting the soul. 4S While many have equated the western discourse of modernity with 
secularism, not much attention has been focused on the above description of modernity as a 
dual-pollutant which encompasses more than just a philosophy that advocates the separation 
of church and state. Abdelwahab Elmessiri is one of the few scholars to have elaborated on 
this in some detail in his writings. 
In spite of the realisation by many that modernity and secularism are synonymous, only a 
special few have pondered over the nature of the secular worldview and how it relates to 
modernity. Elmessiri contends that the identity of western modernity is more in keeping with 
what he refers to as comprehensive secularism. The separation of church and state is a 
world view that cannot claim any comprehensiveness and he thus refers to it as partial 
secularism. He argues that such a worldview confines itself to the realm of politics and 
perhaps economics, but maintains complete silence on absolute or permanent values, be they 
moral, religious or otherwise. It also does not address itself to ultimate things like the origin 
of humanity, human destiny, the purpose of life and other matters. 
By contrast, he points out that comprehensive secularism is a completely different outlook 
that does not merely aim at the separation of church and state and some aspects of public life; 
it aims at the separation of all values - religious, moral, or human - not only from the state but 
also from public and private life and from the world at large.46 Therefore, it is in this 
comprehensive regard that Western modernity and secularism are almost synonymous. In 
referring to one the other is also tacitly implied. As such, Elmessiri defines Western 
modernity as the adoption of value-free science as the basis of humanity's world outlook and 
as a source of values and norms. This outlook reorients the individual to follow value-free 











witness and testifies against the disastrous consequences of this worldview. However, in 
order to manifest this more clearly there has to be a move towards a more holistic reading of 
history, more specifically, a more holistic reading of the history of secularism itself. 
Elmessiri argues that in the Western world the paradigmatic sequence of immanentisation 
(i.e. the shift from a transcendental worldview to a material one), and therefore secularisation, 
modernisation and naturalisation, began sometime in the Middle Ages. This occurred when 
some economic enclaves 'freed' themselves from Christian values or concepts such as 'fair 
price'. He goes on to explain that only strictly economic criteria now applied to economic 
activity and success and failure was stripped of any moral or human considerations. He thus 
asserts that the economic sphere was immanantised, becoming value-free, referring only to 
itself, its criteria and standards being immanent in it. This development established a pattern 
that repeated itself in all other spheres of human activity. 48 
Another significant example of this pattern alluded to by Elmessiri is that of the political 
sphere. He draws our attention to the birth of the theory of the modern state during the 
Renaissance. The state, in this instance, became value-free, justifYing itself by the raison de' 
etat rather than seeking legitimacy on a religious or moral basis. As a result the realm of 
politics freed itself from any values external to it, and was judged by criteria immanent to it. 
In similar vein, all spheres of human life, including science, were freed from religious and 
moral values and considerations, becoming self-sufficient, self-regulating, self-transforming, 
and self-explanatory.49 
Elmessiri bemoans the fact that this emergent secular worldview was never clearly articulated 











piecemeal and diachronic fashion. This history was fragmented into vanous bits, first 
humanism and/or the Reformation, the Enlightenment, rationa1ism, and utilitarianism; then 
the counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Darwinism; then positivism, existentialism, 
phenomenology; and finally the end of history and postmodernism. so This piecemeal 
approach concealed many of the more appalling aspects of the Western modernist worldview. 
Elmessiri argues that this resulted in some of the most shameful ideologies of the recent past 
like Racism, Imperialism and Nazism being seen as mere aberrations, having a history of 
their own, distinct from the history of secularism and modernity. When the Western 
modernist world view is approached holistically it becomes apparent that these so-called 
aberrations are in fact part and parcel of the Western civilisational model. 
His central contention is that by grasping this overall unity and articulating it into a 
comprehensive paradigm - thereby developing a uniform and complex paradigm of 
secularism - we are able to unmask the relationship between the Enlightenment and 
Deconstruction; between modernisation, modernism and postmodernism; between 
Nietzcheanism and Hitler, pragmatism and Eichmann; between rationalism, imperialism, and 
the Holocaust. s1 From the vantage point of this novel paradigm it becomes much easier to 
expose the moral and socio-political trappings of the modernist vision. 
Elmessiri points out that in light of the above it is not plausible to regard oppressive 
ideologies of the past and the present - like Nazism and Zionism - as exceptional cases 
because modernist discourse reflects a general pattern of extermination that began in the 
West from the time of the Renaissance in countries like North America, right up to the 











He supports the contention that there is a direct link between Western civilisation and 
genocide on several grounds.s3 Firstly, he points out that Western civilisation is a 
technological civilisation that elevates progress at any price, even to the detriment of 
humanity. The resultant hardship and suffering, both physically and spiritually, are not of 
much significance in a culture that supports the principle of the survival of the fittest and 
ignores traditional values like being charitable to the weak and lending assistance to those in 
need. By this logic the Nazis were able to legitimate the extermination of the Jews because 
they were viewed as non-productive or useless. This was admittedly an extreme solution but 
Elmessiri argues that other Western countries like America and Poland bear a certain degree 
of culpability because they refused to give asylum to this "useless" ethnic grouping. 
A second trend that justifies drawing parallels between genocide and Western culture is that 
the "solution" to the Jewish problem adopted by the Nazis shares many similarities with 
solutions adopted by other Western Imperialist countries. The genocide of the Red Indians of 
America is an appropriate example. Elmessiri points out that Nazism and Imperialism share 
the common belief of the superiority of the Arian race. 
Finally, he points out that a central trait of West em civilisation - and a phenomenon common 
to both Zionism and Nazism - is the rationality of its procedures and methods and the 
irrationality of its objectives and goals. He notes that this is a characteristic of Western 
civilisation that has also been discussed in the writings of Max Weber, the famous 
sociologist. Perhaps the best examples of this antinomy between objective and method are the 
Nazi death camps and the systematic expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland. In both 
these cases horrendous atrocities are afflicted upon a target population with the utmost 











Charles Taylor, the distinguished Canadian philosopher, tacitly endorses most of the 
contentions made thus far. He identifies three malaises of modernity that challenge blissful 
human existence. These are individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason, and the loss of 
freedom resulting from the preceding two. In his words: "The first fear is about what we 
might call a loss of meaning, the fading of moral horizons. The second concerns the eclipse 
of ends, in face of rampant instrumental reason. And the third is about a loss of freedom". 54 
Taylor equates individualism with a loss of purpose. Its darker side involves a centring on the 
self, which both flattens and narrows our lives making them poorer in meaning and less 
concerned with others or society. These results are manifested in expressions such as 
"permissive society", "me generation", or the prevalence of narcissism. 55 
He explains the second malaise of Modernity -instrumental reason - as a kind of rationality 
that we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. 
In this scheme of things maximum efficiency and the best cost-output ratio is the measure of 
success. 56 
Bringing the two together, he argues that on the political level individualism and instrumental 
reason have frightening consequences. He points out that giving weight to instrumental 
reason, in serious moral deliberation, may be highly destructive. 57 Elmessiri has aptly 
demonstrated this earlier. Taylor thus concludes that any society structured around 
instrumental reason imposes a great loss of freedom on both individuals and the group 
because it is not only our social decisions that are shaped by these forces. He rightfully 











yielding to the pressure of conformity is no less a loss of freedom then submitting to the 
dictates of instrumental reason. 
Although the Modernist vision was inspired by the potential of the individual at its inception, 
history has clearly shown that this has not always been to the advantage of either the 
individual or society. As has been argued above, humanity - as a collective - has had to suffer 
the consequences of what has only recently been recognised as a warped vision. Modernity, 
as a philosophy, did indeed aspire towards moral and socio-political upliftment and therefore 
its failure can only be attributed to an inherent weakness in its vision. It is thus necessary to 
analyse the philosophical underpinnings of Modernity in order to understand the considerable 
trauma it has exacted upon the social unit as well as the individual. 
3.2 Critique of the philosophical underpinnings of Modernity 
Parvez Manzoor, a trenchant critic of Modernity, provides an apt and concise summary of the 
main contentions raised against it. It is worth quoting him at length as he provides us with a 
firm basis for proceeding on to a deeper critique of the philosophical underpinnings of 
Modernity. In his unique style, Parvez Manzoor points out: 
that the truth claims of Enlightenment reason are based on circular logic; 
that the notion of a sovereign, transcendent and ahistorical, subject whose reason is the 
touchstone of all knowledge is extremely 'problematic'; 
that the doctrine of progress is 'paradoxical'; 
that the cult of freedom which renders all 'taboos' illegitimate and wmecessary is inimical to 
the preservation of any kind of moral, and by extension, social and political, order; 
that the charter of the modem political community, nay any political community, is always 











that the universality of justice and rights is a metaphysical claim that cannot be redeemed 
within a socio-political context; 
indeed, that the jurisdiction of both reason and meaning extends far beyond the cosmopolis of 
modernity. 59 
Hindsight sometimes casts harsh glances upon the past and it therefore has to be remembered 
that time alone can teJI whether visions of the future are to meet with success or not. Bearing 
this in mind, Parvez Manzoor indicates that the delegitimation of modernity is important 
because it not only opens up a new intellectual space, but it also creates a different agenda for 
a dialogue between modernists and others.60 In order to pursue this dialogue to its fullest we 
must go back to the beginning and examine the philosophical roots of modernity with a 
critical eye. 
As has been argued earlier, the Enlightenment marked a decisive epistemological shift that 
ushered in the age of modernity. The majority of the philosophers of the Enlightenment 
embraced the shift from a God-centred world view to one that centred on the individual. 
However, only an elite few can be regarded as the 'Mapmakers'. These were the individuals 
that broke new ground, charting a course in whose path others were to follow. The most 
important of them are Roger Bacon, Rene' Descartes and Auguste Comte.61 Although Parvez 
Manzoor raises many criticisms against modernity it is important to briefly examine the 
contributions and criticisms of these three individuals because of their centrality to the 
modernist worldview. 
Bacon is regarded as the father of the experimental method in the West. Although this major 
breakthrough revolutionised the experimental sciences, it had the adverse effect of separating 











more concerned with how to achieve a set goal rather than why to pursue it in the first place. 
This has prompted a scholar of more recent times to suggest that ever since then the West has 
stopped asking why questions. The focus has shifted to how to make an atom bomb and no 
one asks why we should have one in the first place.62 This emergence of value"free science 
compliments and corresponds to the trend pointed out by Elmessiri in his discussion on 
value-free economics and politics. Bacon's scientific method spawned a philosophy of non-
accountability that became pivotal in entrenching the instrumental reason censured by 
Charles Taylor above. Despite the profound impact of Bacon's thought in modem times, his 
contribution to the corpus of human knowledge carried within it a virulent and destructive 
strand. Notwithstanding, his thought was by no means as influential or as dangerous as that of 
Descartes' . 
Rene' Descartes is without a doubt the most important of the three philosophers mentioned. 
Whereas Bacon is credited with revolutionising the experimental sciences, Descartes was 
responsible for revolutionising no less than the human mind. It was his philosophy that 
ushered in the epistemological age. Ever since Descartes most philosophers - even those 
critical of him - have been defining their ontology, their view of what is, on the basis of a 
prior doctrine of what we can knoW.63 In the words of Charles Taylor: "they are all practising 
the structural idealism ofthe epistemological age." 
As Taylor explains, central to the philosophy articulated by Descartes is the view that we can 
somehow come to grips with the problem of knowledge and as such legitimate our opinions 
on various things like God, the world, or human life.64 Descartes felt that he had solved the 
problem of knowledge by calling into question everything that could be doubted until he 











enormous consequences. Using it as a foundation, one is able to deduce the existence of all 
real things - including God - by arguing from the reality of thought to a presumed reality of 
being.66 By following this approach, the modern West inherited a twofold legacy from 
Descartes: 
(1) afoundationalism that equates knowledge with secure foundations and clear and distinct ideas, 
and (2) an emphasis on subjectivity that anchors the knowledge of God but leaves the world of 
nature "godless." 
This decisive shift in the understanding of subjectivity's importance is connected with other 
cultural developments. As the Newtonian and mechanical worldview was increasingly established 
as the only legitimate scientific position, a move from theism to deism took place. The terms 
"deism" and "theism" were originally synonymous, but "deism" came to refer to the view that the 
divine lacks an immediate ongoing personal relation to the world [ ... ]. David Hume's (1711-76) 
critique of the metaphysical view of causality and his demolition of the argument from miracles 
advanced a naturalistic view of the world; and in the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin's theory 
of evolution further undercut natural theologies, with evolution providing an alternative 
explanation to divine theology. These developments in the natural sciences eliminated God 
entirely from the order and design of the material world.67 
Not only did Descartes' cogito result in the loss of transcendence - thereby rendering 
revelation and its whole claim to faith futile and useless - it also established the individual 
awareness of one's own limited self as the criterion of existence.68 This rejection of both 
transcendence and community at once, turned human society into an arena of confrontation 
between individuals and groups driven by their will to growth and their will to power.69 The 
implications of this mind set carry the gravest of consequences. Humankind had effectively 
taken the subjective self as the locus for all values thereby leaving society to the mercy of the 











Moving firmly along this trajectory, Western thought then encountered the positivism of 
Auguste Comte. Positivism is best explained as the denial of reality to anything not perceived 
through the senses, or not measurable by mathematics; this became the tacit postulate of all 
that goes under the name of "modern science" or "Western science", pervading the 
humanities and social sciences since Comte as well. All of these disciplines rest on the 
premise that man is merely another object of nature, similar to the objects studied in physics, 
chemistry and bio]ogy.7o 
Comtean philosophy adopts an inimical posture to religious or metaphysical beliefs, 
dismissing them as mere fictions and superstition, which will ultimately be overrun by 
positive or scientific developments in which explanation takes the form of showing 
correlations between observed phenomena.71 Critics of Comte - on this account - dismiss his 
theory in light of the resurgence of religion in the current era and as such accuse him of 
reifying bourgeois-scientific standards of knowledge as well as displaying Eurocentric 
arrogance. 72 
Further, critics of the absolute faith placed in science by Comtean Philosophy point out that 
science itself has disproved the objectivity and decisiveness of its outcomes: 
The concept of relativity and the new horizons in macrocosmos and microcosmos showed that 
each scientific innovation complicates the problems because of creating more unknown variables 
than before, rather than reaching to a decisive truth. 73 
Bacon, Descartes and Comte were all bound by a singular faith, that is, a faith in the 
subjective self. They brought to the experimental sciences, philosophy and the social sciences 











their stead tried to establish a fixed centre that served as the source and foundation of all that 
could be known. This in essence was the promise that was made by modernity. By shifting 
from the transcendent (that which was beyond) to the immanent (that which was within), 
humankind would progress and know only prosperity. However, after a few centuries in 
which there had indeed been remarkable progress humanity once again found itself at an 
impasse due to the discontents of modernity. As pointed out earlier by Parvez Manzoor, most 
scholars now reject the claims made by modernity as rather tenuous. This marked the shift, 
once again, from one paradigm of thought to another. Loss of faith in the project of 
modernity was accompanied by the onset of postmodernity. 
4. From the Discontents of Modernity to Postmodernity 
A prominent contemporary scholar remarks that until Descartes the various levels of reality 
that determined human existence were understood in relation to God. Then, with the onset of 
Cartesian rationalism, individual human existence became the criterion of reality and truth. In 
the mainstream of Western thought, ontology gave way to epistemology, epistemology to 
logic, and finally logic was confronted by the antirational 'philosophies' so prevalent today?4 
Abdelwahab Elmessiri is once again helpful in charting out the course that saw the shift from 
modernity and its discontents to postmodernity.7s As mentioned earlier, he argues that 
modernity - and therefore comprehensive secularism - is a form of immanence, implying that 
rising levels of secularisation meant rising levels of immanentisation. This naturally leads to 
the virtual disappearance of God as the transcendental organising power in the universe: 
We can view the whole process of immanentization I modernization I secularization in tenns of 
the death of God discourse. God first became incarnate not in man but in humanity as a whole, 











This hwnanism became racism when God is incarnate in one people; it becomes fascism when 
God is incarnate in the leader. But the incarnation is not confmed to the human sphere, for God 
becomes incarnate in nature. This gives rise to the sharp dualism [of humanity versus nature and 
of subject versus object] and the frantic attempt of German idealistic philosophy to assert the 
parallelism of humanity and nature, subject and object. Then God became incarnate in nature-
matter only [ ... ] with nature-matter at the center. Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel all operated in terms 
of this stage of immanence, which, despite all its fluctuations and divisions, is logocentric. This 
gave rise to Enlightenment, Western rationalism, and what 1 term heroic materialism. 
But the process went on inexorably, and immanentization (secularization I modernization) went 
deeper. The center kept on shifting and the incarnations became too many, until we were faced 
with multiple centers. Nature itself was fragmented and atomized. Losing its stability, coherence, 
and self-referentiality, it could no longer serve as a stable centre.'6 
We now have to tum our attention to postmodernism in order to make sense of the shift from 
a fixed centre - as in the case of modernity - to the rise of multiple centres, multiple 
alternatives, and a mu1tiplicity of truths. 
5. The Postmodern Worlclview 
The majority of scholars express the view that postmodernity is no more than a continuation 
or a further unfolding of modernity. 77 Elmessiri describes postmodernity as a move from "the 
solid logocentric stage of modernity to its liquid stage, the stage of materialist irrationalism 
and antiheroism and a centerless world".78 Whereas modernity had renounced the authority of 
religion - displacing metaphysics in favour of reason - postmodernity no longer asserts 
anything positive or substantive. Postmodern theory renounces even reason as a foundational 











Modernist consciousness, which progressively shifted its gaze from 'reason' to 'nature' to 
'history', now proclaims that there exists no Archemedian point, no foundational text, that may 
guide our humanity towards any desirable or conceivable goal. Rather, the admission is that 
reason is unable to overcome the antinomy of norm and history, that the 'is' of world-history does 
not lead to any 'ought' of the human existence. 79 
So, while postmodernity does indeed proceed on the same continuum as modernity, it can be 
more accurately described as "the rejection of modernist ideology in a modem world". 80 
Modernist ideology had previously dictated that reason alone can prevail and that only 
through reason can human beings conquer and control nature. At the very least, modernist 
ideology sought to cast a firm and absolute foundation that served as the basis of reality. 
Postmodernity, by contrast, argues that there are multiple realities that are not necessarily 
related.81 The postmodern condition is one that transcends the arguments and battles of which 
view of reality was true to the position that none are true.82 This sceptical posture is a true 
reflection of the fundamental axiomatic principal of postmodernist thought: suspicion and 
rejection of all 'grand narratives'. 
Postmodernists refer to any legitimating discourse as a 'grand narrative' or a 'metanarrative'. 
Metanarratives or grand narratives are referred to as such because they claim to be able to 
account for, explain, and subordinate all lesser narratives. 83 Religious ideologies like Islam 
and Christianity and political ideologies like Marxism are also examples of grand narratives 
in that they provide the ethos or worldview according to which the individual - and 
ultimately society - fashions hislher very existence. 
Reason - as a concept that informs truth and acts as the criterion for determining what 











ascendancy in the 18th century when it was applied to every area of life like religion, 
morality, politics, and social life. Reason served as the foundational norm that was used to 
justify everything, just as religion before it. 
[postmodernism] rejects the pursuit of "grand narratives" and denies the possibility of acquiring 
comprehensive knowledge through "scientific" methods. For postmodernism, reason cannot be a 
reliable source of knowledge because reason itself is a hegemonic project. Ultimate truth is 
impossible to attain because everyone has hislher own truth.84 
It should now be manifestly clear that the postmodern response to the crisis of modernity -
the failure of its grand narratives - has been to relativise all truth claims. Whereas modernists 
sought to find meaning in totality, later scholars pointed out that the only secure thing about 
modernity is its insecurity~ it is in a perpetual state of flux and it is this flux that defines the 
main nature of postmodernity.85 Whereas progress had been the distinguishing feature of 
modernity, nihilism or the loss of any spiritual centre is what distinguishes postmodernity.86 
While modernity sought to establish a foundational text - a foundational norm or grand 
narrative - that legitimated and explained its project, postmodernity vociferously rejected any 
kind of foundational text. In spite of this rejection, critics have argued that postmodern 
discourse is in itself nothing more then another grand narrative. It is as such imperative to 
consider this, as well as other criticisms of postmodernism. 
Critics have argued that the notion that people have stopped believing in grand narratives 
because such narratives marginalise minorities inadvertently make the assumption that all 
people universally believe in justice, which is in itself another grand narrative.87 Therefore, 
postmodernism is as guilty as modernism for perpetuating grand narratives. In denying any 











flux as the norm or only reality. Such relativism is not arbitrary and in fact engenders a 
unique philosophy of its own. For example, critics point out that postmodernism even has its 
own metaphysics despite its frantic attempt to deny any metaphysical stance.88 Elmessiri is of 
the view that while postmodernism denies transcendence, totality, permanence, and duality, 
its very denial has shown its true philosophical identity as an expression of the metaphysics 
of immanence. 89 This is a point that has been alluded to earlier. 
While most critics concede that postmodernism has indeed proven to be effective as a critique 
of modernity, they also point out that it does not constitute an alternative social and political 
project due to its inherent cynicism and nihilism. 90 However, postmodernist discourse has 
won favour with almost every marginalised ideology because of its inherent pluralistic 
nature. While it is not emphatic in endorsing any given position, it is by no means categorical 
in dismissing any given view either. This has created plenty of space for groups previously 
rejected by mainstream, hegemonic ideologies like modernity. A pertinent example is the re-
emergence of religion and spirituality. The case of Islam will now be stressed to emphasise 
and explore this rebirth. 
6. From Postmodernism to Islamism 
The resurgence of religion in both industrial and peasant societies is one of the most 
significant features of transcending postmodernism.91 One may even argue that it is a 
resurgence borne out of the exasperation of treading on shaky ground. While postmodernism 
is to be fully acknowledged for creating the space that made such a resurgence possible, it has 
failed dismally - as a philosophy - to provide a firm foundation for an alternative world 











Islamism, or the influence of an Islamic worldview in the socio-political sphere, is a specific 
example of this resurgence. Islamism is viewed as a product of the frustration of the promises 
of Western modernisation and, more specifically, represents a critique of modernism that 
displays remarkable similarities with postmodernism.92 These similarities include a rejection 
of the determinism, rationalism, and positivism of the modernist paradigm.93 However, there 
are fundamental differences between Islamism and postmodernism that ultimately make them 
incompatible. Ali Bulac, an Islamist scholar, explains that Islam is ultimately a 'total 
doctrine' that rejects the universalism and relativism ofpostmodernism.94 
In spite of the fundamental differences, it is quite enlightening to explore the fascination that 
postmodernism holds for Islamists. Mustafa Armagan, another Islamist thinker, is helpful in 
this regard. He explains that: 
[ ... ] postmodernism is attractive to Islamists because: (1) it shows the failures and limitations of 
modernism; (2) given the exhaustion of modernism, the postmodernist search for alternatives 
opens up an opportunity for Islam; (3) in their rejection of the secular uniformity of modernism, 
postmodernists freely borrow from tradition and religion which lslamists advocate; (4) the 
postmodernist emphasis on diversity and (5) the announcement of the death of 'meta-narratives' 
strengthens the hand of Islam in its struggle against modern 'isms' such as socialism, positivism 
or Darwinism.95 
Returning to the critique of postmodernism, Armagan argues that postmodernist 'playfulness' 
results in the rejection of a unitary point of reference for truth and thereby endorses the 
acceptance of multiple perspectives as equally valid. He therefore holds that this constitutes a 











secularisation, undertaken by modernism, the self recreated the outside world (society, state, 
nature, art, religion, etc) by using reason. 
In the current phase of secularization, the self has begun to reflect on the outside world which the 
self created through reflection in the first place. Modernists, although secularized, still retained the 
traditional notion of a distinction between form and essence. For the postmodemists, however, 
form is everything - style constitutes content and rhetoric makes up reality. 96 
Because of this, he regards postmodernism as a commercial paganism that turns religions into 
playthings and cannot as such be an ally to Islam. The stage is therefore now set for deep and 
critical introspection that should produce compelling solutions to the exigencies of everyday 
life. Such solutions should be brought forth from Islam's very own unique tradition. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter began with three epigraphs that represented the intellectual trends of modernity, 
postmodernity and the resurgent voice of authentic Islam. In what followed, an attempt was 
made to chart the course of Islamic thought concentrating specifically on its junctures with 
modernity and postmodernity. By now it should be quite apparent that Islamic thought did 
not readily succumb to the charms of the dominant discourses with which it interacted. There 
is no denying that certain scholars made strong cases in favour of modernist or postmodernist 
orientations, but these attempts were not able to silence the dissent of those who chose to 
speak in favour of an authentic Islamic alternative. 
What these unfolding developments clearly stress is that the discourses of modernity and 
postmodernity were by no means compelling enough to prompt a wholesale abandonment of 











of an Islamic alternative or foundational text. Attention will now be turned towards 
examining what the basis of this claim exactly entails and whether it is truly justifiable. 
Condemnation of modernity's proffered solutions reaches near climax so it seems odd that 
Muslims should be arguing for the re-establishment of the foundational text - albeit on their 
own terms. Added to this is the sceptical voice of postmodernism stilI cautioning against the 
adoption of grand narratives. It must now be established whether the Qur'an is indeed able to 
vindicate the claims ofIslamic authenticity, or whether modernist and postmodernist rhetoric 
is able to refute the validity of the Qur'an as foundational text. Chapter two will examine the 
validity ofIslam's claim to authenticity, while chapter three aims to finally address the status 
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Continuing in the old ways does not necessarily mean preserving our heritage or 
holding on to our authenticity. Authenticity is not a fixed point in the past to which we 
must return in order to establish our identity. It is rather a constant capacity for 
movement and for going beyond existing limits towards a world which, while 
assimilating the past and its knowledge, looks ahead to a better future. - Adonis 1 
Today, man's fundamental problem is self-assertion rather than simple self-
preservation. The question of self-assertion necessarily leads to the question of self-
perception. - Ahmet Davutoglu 1 
For I am woman (or man) by accident but Muslim by choice ... - Maysam al-
FirOqe 
1. Introduction 
The most important factor enabling Islamic thought to maintain relevance in light of the 
challenges of modernity and postmodernity has been its persistent claims to authenticity. 
Many Muslim scholars argue that Islam is different from other world views or ideologies 
and not only special or privileged for adherents to the faith; Islam is somehow 
intrinsically unique. 
The opening epigraphs once again serve as a broad framework for this chapter. Adonis 
(CAli Ahmed Said), a Syrian essayist and poet of great depth and substance poignantly 











immortalised in the heritage or tradition of any given social collective, but much more. 
We cannot reclaim who we are by returning to a fixed point to re-enact the past because 
identity is far more firmly embedded. We need to dig deeper in order to establish who we 
indeed are. Authenticity is therefore not about tradition as much as it is about the essence 
of being. Abmet Davutoglu, the Turkish philosopher whose insightful epitaph makes the 
important link between identity and authenticity, aptly captures this. He emphasises that 
one has to possess the necessary self-awareness before being able to make any assertions 
of uniqueness or authenticity. Finally, Maysam al-Faruqi reminds us that we all choose 
who we essentially are and consequently none can truly be Muslim except by choice. 
However, identity is by no means uni-dimensional and there are many components that 
contribute to the individual makeup of any person. In this complex hierarchy of the self 
there is always one component that is granted primary importance and by which a person 
chooses to be identified. For the committed Muslim primacy is given to Islam. 
A fundamental trait of Islam is that it is logocentric~ it is a faith wherein the Qur'an is 
privileged as the wellspring of all guidance and values. The preceding chapter has shown 
that the intellectual discourses of modernity and postmodernity had sought to challenge 
this privileged position. Modernity offered reason as an alternative and Postmodernity 
happily played the role of sceptic and all-round critic. While the Qur'an may not have 
been completely subverted in the face of this onslaught, none would deny that Islamic 
thought was effectively shoved into hibernation by the sheer appeal of modernist 
discourse. It is only with the failure of modernity and the onset of postmodernity that we 











The main task of this chapter, therefore, is to attempt to vindicate Islam's claims of 
authenticity. In order to do so effectively, I will construct a philosophical backbone 
sturdy enough to support and uphold these assertions. I will move on to a detailed 
exposition of where the Qur'an fits into the scheme of things in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I will argue that Islamic authenticity has to be understood in terms of 
ontological self-perception. The re-emergence of the Qur'an as foundational text must 
therefore be viewed as a re-assertion of this ontological self-perception. This is an 
absolute prerequisite to understanding the position of the Qur'an in the Islamic 
epistemological hierarchy. Classical Muslim scholarship understood the importance of 
ontology and regarded it as the basis for any given epistemology. However, as Charles 
Taylor has pointed out, modern philosophy (since Descartes) has granted pride of place to 
epistemology so that ontology has ever since been defined on the basis of prior doctrines 
of what we can know, i.e. epistemology has since dictated what constitutes ontology.4 
This is a problem that will be grappled with in some detail here. I will argue that every 
epistemology is an articulation of ontology, even if this very important insight is 
unacknowledged or remains unrecognised. This clearly suggests that ontology has to be 
given primacy over epistemology in order to truly understand the foundations of any 











Of even greater importance is the role of ontology in human agency. In this regard I will 
argue that there is a direct relationship between conceptions of the self and moral action. 
Similar to the case of epistemology, all moral actions also re-affirm a given ontology. 
Since Islamic thought is the framework within which this study is located, I will 
demonstrate the relevance of these assertions by comparing and contrasting it with the 
alternative paradigm of secularism. I will explore the ontological underpinnings of both 
paradigms thereby demonstrating that Islamic thought and secular thought spawn very 
different worldviews. This should go a long way to explaining the acute cultural and 
ideological dilemmas that inevitably arise at the juncture of these essentially distinct 
philosophies. 
Finally, I will revisit the question of authenticity in order to explain what it is, which 
requires explaining what understanding Islamic authenticity in terms of ontological self-
perception entails. 
2. OntolOgical Self-Perception 
Shifts in philosophical method and outlook are in recent times popUlarly being referred to 
as "turns".,5 It should by now be quite apparent that I have been paying particular 
attention to two very important developments, respectively referred to as the 
"epistemological turn" and the "ontological tum." Philosophy in the modem period is 
characterised by a shift from its previous preoccupation with metaphysical issues to an 











turn" dominated philosophy for at least two centuries, only being brought under critical 
scrutiny in the early part of the last century.6 Such critical examination resulted in a 
search for new alternatives and different approaches. Anglo~American philosophy, for 
example, took a "I;nguistic turn" in the early part of the last century, analyzing language, 
and thereby seeking to achieve many of the same goals sought by epistemology in its 
analysis of the mind.7 In similar vein, I will be arguing the case in favour of an 
"ontological turn." 
2.1 From the epistemological turn to the ontological turn 
Charles Taylor argues that the main reason for the dominance of the epistemological 
model lies in the supposed unintelligibility of a rival account.s The model had gained 
such popularity that it became "too obvious for words." Stated differently, the 
epistemological model became "the organizing principle for a wide range of the practices 
in which we think and act and deal with the world." The influence of this model has been 
virtually all-pervasive, embedded in our interaction with the natural sciences, technology, 
our construal of political life, in our methods of healing, regimenting, organising people 
in society and numerous other spheres.9 Taylor advises that freeing oneself from this 
model cannot be done by just showing an alternative. 
What we need to do is get over the presumption of the unique conceivability of the embedded 
picture. But to do this, we have to take a new stance towards our practices. Instead of just 
living in them and taking their implicit construa1 of things as the way things are, we have to 











This in brief is what taking the ontological tum entails. In order to free the epistemologist 
from the imprisonment of his own model we need to be able to understand how this 
worldview came into being and then show what an alternative would look like. A 
considerable part of the first chapter dealt with this world view and its intimate link with 
the discourse of modernity. I will now devote attention to showing what the chosen 
alternative, namely the ontological tum, entails. However, a few brief comments on the 
epistemological tum are necessary beforehand. 
Philosophy in the modem period has drawn its authority from epistemology, more 
specifically, from its claim to provide the foundations for the rest of inquiry. 
"Epistemology reigned as "the tribunal of pure reason," the high priest of culture that 
could authorise some intellectual endeavors and condemn others". 11 In brief, the basis of 
the epistemological tum was its position on the foundations of knowledge and the 
knowing subject. 12 Theories of knowledge served as the foundation of truth and 
falsehood and were products of human reason, residing within the individual self Reason 
as such determined what we could know and this in effect affirmed what existed. This is 
obviously a simple reduction of thought processes that took centuries to unfold but it 
aptly captures the essence of the epistemological paradigm in its most extreme form. 
Ancient Philosophy directed the idea of existence to the physical world, in which matter 
was regarded as an eternal substance. 13 Modem philosophy, initiated by Descartes, began 
to doubt the existence of the physical world by the realisation that reality cannot be 











This marked a new phase in metaphysical thought, and pnmacy now shifted from 
ontology (the study of what exists) to epistemology (the study of what we can knoW).14 
While the epistemological tum leaves behind a tremendous legacy, it is still worthwhile 
asking whether ignoring ontology was really justifiable. In order to establish this, the 
issue must be examined at the level of metaphysics. 
The subject matter of classical metaphysics was "the study of that which exists through 
that which exists". 15 In its original meaning, metaphysics was not some fantastic attempt 
to establish a world behind the world but rather an analysis of those structures of being 
that we encounter in every meeting with reality. 16 Therefore, according to this definition 
ontology and metaphysics are synonymous; but "the preposition meta now has the 
irremediable connotation of pointing to a duplication of this world by a transcendent 
realm of beings. Therefore, it is perhaps less misleading to speak of ontology instead of 
metaphysics". 17 
In the modem period we find that the subject matter of metaphysics is no longer that 
which exists but rather thought itself. This is because "when humankind began to 
question that which they knew, becoming aware of the instruments of this knowledge, 
thought itself became the subject of thought".18 This pithy comment very accurately 
describes the epistemological tum. Even though the classical and contemporary subject-
matter of metaphysics seem to be at variance - the first being concerned with human 
existence and the latter with human thought - both are reducible to the central issue of 











other words, even though philosophy has largely ignored ontology by focusing on 
epistemology, questions of being are ultimately unavoidable. This realisation has not 
come easily and is still lost to many. No matter what "shifts" or "turns" occur 10 
philosophy, at a metaphysical level, ontological primacy is unavoidable: 
The function of metaphysics has become to inquire into the essential structure of our thought, 
while still preserving its primary function; and indeed its new function [inquiring into the 
structure of our thought] does not conflict with its primary function [inquiring into being or 
existence]. lbat is because if we inquire into the essential categories of human thought and 
the existing relationships between the two, and the reliance of the one on the other, then we 
would be compelled to inquire into the existing relationships between the various forms of 
existence that we accept in our body of rational concepts. In this case ontological primacy 
will never be given up but will simply be given a clearer meaning. What is given up is the 
idea of the separate reality as a possible field of inquiry. 19 
This insight is of tremendous importance because it makes absolutely clear that 
epistemological paradigms are no more than manufactured products shaped by 
ontological concerns. Epistemically speaking, thought paradigms could be described as 
predicates of judgement, but ontologically, they ascribe modes of existence.2o Attention 
will now be devoted to explaining this in some detail. 
2.2. The primacy of ontology 
Our inquiry thus far has been implicitly oscillating between the disciplines of philosophy 
and theology, suggesting a strong link between the two. However, this inter~disciplinary 











other discipline. Islamic thought is a compound construct with many facets, including the 
philosophical and the theological. The inference being suggested is that what ultimately 
resides at the core of any thought paradigm is the question of being. Islamic thought is in 
this regard no different. Therefore, the link that binds philosophy and theology is 
necessarily ontological. This assertion warrants further explanation. 
Whereas theology can be described as constituting a special realm of knowledge that 
deals with a special object and employs a special method, there is no generally accepted 
definition of philosophy in this regard. 21 Detailing the nature and concern of theology is 
necessary before exploring any definition of philosophy and its relationship to theology. 
Paul Tillich insightfully points out that theology moves back and forth between two 
poles, "the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal 
truth must be received". 22 While his elaboration goes on to address the issue specifically 
within the Christian tradition, the scope of his insight is much broader. By stressing the 
continuity between the eternal and the temporal, or what can be equally described as the 
relationship between the transcendent and the immanent, he captures a central concern of 
the religious experience. The very same concern resonates powerfully in the work of 
Fazlur Rahman, specifically in his attempt to develop a Qur)anic hermeneutic that is able 











Theology - as is construed here - is thus tasked with responding to the totality of human 
creative self-interpretation in a specific context or time by emphasising the unchangeable 
truth of its message over and against the changing demands of any given situation.24 With 
this in mind TiHich proposes two formal criteria of theology. The first criterion holds 
that: 
The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are 
theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate 
concern for uJS 
TiHich indicates that social ideas, legal projects and political programs are all potentially 
objects of theology, not from the point of view of their social, legal, or political form, but 
in that they have the power of actualising some aspects of that which concerns us 
ultimately in and through their social, legal, and political forms. 26 By considering the 
content of our ultimate concerns, i.e., by questioning what concerns us unconditionally, 
we arrive at the second formal criterion of theology: 
Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or non-being. Only those statements 
are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of being or 
not-being for uJ7 
Only that which has the power of saving or threatening our being can be of ultimate 
concern to us. Tillich explicitly points out that the term "being" means the whole of 











not simply designate existence in time and space, which may be continuously threatened 
and saved by things and events that are ultimately of no concern to us. Theology 
therefore primarily addresses the question of being and, more specifically, that which is 
of ultimate concern to the believer. This brief exposition brings us closer to 
understanding the relationship between theology and philosophy. A workable definition 
of philosophy is now needed for a completely lucid exposition of the link between the 
two. 
There have been many attempts to reduce philosophy to specific sub-disciplines that 
generally reflect the dominance of one method or school over another. For example, Neo-
Kantian schools in the nineteenth century attempted to reduce philosophy to 
epistemology and ethics; in the twentieth century, the goal of logical positivism and 
related schools was to reduce it to logical calculus. 28 Tillich argues that both these 
attempts to avoid the ontological question have been unsuccessful. 
He suggests that a far more modest approach to philosophy is to call it "that cognitive 
approach to reality in which reality as such is the object",z9 This is a far more 
encompassing definition that stresses the philosophical question: 
Reality as such, or reality as a whole, is not the whole of reality; it is the structure which 
makes reality a whole and therefore a potential object of knowledge. Inquiring into the nature 
of reality as such means inquiring into those structures, categories, and concepts which are 
presupposed in the cognitive encounter with every realm of reality. From this point of view 











those structures which make experience possible. There is no difference in this respect 
between constructive idealism and empirical realism. The question regarding the character of 
the general structures that make experience possible is always the same. It is the 
philosophical question.30 
The crux of Tillich's argument is that because philosophy asks the question of reality as a 
whole, it is compelled to answer in ontological terms. The ontological question is 
unavoidable, even if this is denied by any of the philosophical schools. He categorically 
affirms that every epistemology contains an implicit ontology "[s]ince knowing is an act 
which participates in being or, more precisely, in an "ontic relation," every analysis of the 
act of knowing must refer to an interpretation of being".31 The importance of framing 
philosophy in ontological terms is that it avoids the grievous error of masking what is of 
ultimate importance. Philosophy as epistemology is overly concerned with the nature and 
criteria of knowledge at the expense of its existential implications. 
From this perspective the link between philosophy and theology is clearly manifest. Both 
disciplines converge on the question of reality as a whole. They as such question the 
structure of being thereby according primacy to ontological concerns.32 It must be 
acknowledged that the two disciplines converge as well as diverge in the manner in 
which they address the question of being, but what is of importance to us is that they 
effectively ask the same question. 
The implications of raising the question of being are far-reaching and of central 











epistemology. The reduction of philosophy to epistemology fails to address our ultimate 
concerns, which can only be achieved by lending primacy to ontology. An added 
consequence of raising the question of being is that it forces those operating within 
epistemological paradigms to firstly acknowledge and then to interrogate the implicit 
ontologies articulated by these paradigms. Only then can one truly begin to assess the 
value systems upon which any given paradigm is founded because - as argued earlier 
all ontologies ascribe modes of existence that relate directly to what is of ultimate 
concern to the knowing subject. Conceptions of the self are thereby far more clearly 
articulated because our ultimate concerns define who we are, not just existentially, but 
morally as well. 
What is being suggested is that there is a direct relationship between conceptions of the 
self and moral action and, similar to the case of epistemology, all moral actions also re-
affirm a given ontology. This will now be discussed in detail by addressing the 
relationship between ontology and human agency. 
3. Ontology and Human Agency 
Much of our discussion thus far has been focused on emphasising the implicit ontologies 
underlying any given epistemological paradigm. Far from simply being an abstract 
exercise in philosophical theorisation, this has direct bearing upon everyday human 
behavior. The insights grasped thus far must now be put into the service of addressing the 











exploring the relationship between ontology and human agency, l.e. the relationship 
between sense of being and individual action and behavior. 
I will argue that actions and judgement predicates are informed by a certain moral 
ontology indicative of who we are, even if this ontology remains largely implicit. What 
this clearly suggests is that moral agency is a basic component of the self 
The above also suggests that identity is ultimately defined in moral space. It cannot be 
otherwise, since our moral reactions reflect what is of paramount importance to us. Stated 
differently, it may be said that moral discrimination is driven by what concerns us 
ultimately. Therefore, any given worldview is no more than a specific ontological 
framework constructed in moral space. This clearly expresses the link between identity 
and morality. Tracing notions of what individuals regard as good helps us to effectively 
map out the evolution of human agency and related conceptions of seltbood. It also 
effectively demonstrates the fact that the affirmation of certain goods necessarily 
involves discriminating against - if not completely rejecting - contrary conceptions of the 
good. 
Drawing attention to ontology thus goes a long way in dispelling notions of moral 
relativism. In terms of our actions and judgement predicates, the view that any given 
notion of what is good is equally valid to an opposing counterpart is patently false. 
Consequently, when we are faced with two options we always incline towards one, even 











a lot about our moral proclivities, even if our actions remain strictly laissez-faire. Moral 
relativism must therefore ultimately be regarded as an impossibility. Attention will now 
be devoted to explaining these assertions in sufficient detail. 
3. J Moral agency as a basic component of the self 
The work of Charles Taylor is acknowledged as the best starting point for recovering a 
strong and crucial understanding of the self as moral subject.33 Durkheim had made the 
development of a sociology of morality central to his intellectual mission about a century 
ago, but felt that in order to rescue moral discourse he had to displace the individual: 
Morality turned, he argued, not on individuals' variant faculties, nor on mora! choice as an 
exercise of free will, but on social processes more basic than individuals. The effect of a 
mora! order was produced directly by social causes.34 
In sheer contrast to Durkheim, Taylor aims "to place the construction of the person back 
in the center of moral thought [.] Taylor's claim is not that the self - the person, identity-
is prior to morality, but rather that it is constituted in and through the taking of moral 
stances".3S He laments the fact that the connections between senses of the self and moral 
visions have been obscured by the moral philosophies dominant today. It is therefore 
necessary to restate the relation between self and morals.36 
Taylor argues that what is normally described as the 'moral' encompasses far more than 
our notions and reactions pertaining to justice, well-being, dignity, and respect of other 











need to examine what underlies our own dignity and question what makes our lives 
meaningful or fulfilling as well. 37 Most of our moral intuitions are so uncommonly deep, 
powerful, and universal that Taylor feels we may be tempted to think of them as rooted in 
instinct. These universal moral reactions need to be contrasted with those that seem to be 
very much the consequence of upbringing and education. Taylor therefore asserts that our 
moral reactions have two facets: 
On one side, they are almost like instincts, comparable to our love of sweet things, or our 
aversion to nauseous substances, or our fear of falling; on the other hand they seem to involve 
claims, implicit or explicit, about the nature and status of human beings. From this second 
side. a moral reaction is an assent to, an affirmation of, a given ontology of the human.38 
It is from the second facet that we are able to grasp the centrality of moral agency as a 
basic component of the self. In this regard Taylor argues that ontological accounts have 
the status of articulations of our moral instincts as they articulate the claims implicit in 
our reactions. For him our deepest moral instincts are to be treated as our modes of access 
to the world in which ontological claims are discernible and can be rationally argued 
about and sifted?9 He is however careful to point out that the moral ontology behind any 
person's views can remain largely implicit. In this regard, many people would be hard 
pressed to choose when faced with both theistic and secular ontologies - for example - as 
the grounds for any specific moral reaction. What is of greater importance is 
acknowledging that one or another ontology is in fact the only adequate basis for our 











Therefore, ontological consciousness - or sense of being - impacts directly upon human 
agency, determining one's orientation in moral space. However, our conceptions of self 
do not only constitute the core of our moral responses; they represent an ontology that 
forges an important component of our identities as welL As such, we must now explore 
notions of the good to elicit a deeper understanding of our multi-faceted identities. Here 
too, one finds a strong link between identity and morality, and therefore, recognition of 
the impact of ontology upon human agency. 
3.2 The link between identity and morality 
I have suggested earlier that identity is ultimately defined in moral space, and therefore, 
any given worldview is nothing other than a specific ontological framework constructed 
in this space. The importance of such frameworks is central to Taylor's conceptualisation 
of identity: 
Frameworks provide the background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgements, 
intuitions, or reactions in any of the three dimensions. To articulate a framework is to 
explicate what makes sense of our moral responses. That is, when we tty to spell out what it 
is that we presuppose when we judge that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place 
our dignity in a certain achievement or status, or defme our moral obligations in a certain 
manner, we find ourselves articulating inter alia what I have been calling here 'frameworks'. 
f ... ] The claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human 
agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we 











These concerns may be brought more sharply into focus by ralsmg the question of 
identity. Taylor is categorical in asserting that the question 'who am 11' cannot be 
addressed by giving name and genealogy. The only compelling response is to answer in 
tenns of what is of crucial importance to us: 
My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or 
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or 
what ought to be done, or what 1 endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within 
which I am capable of taking a stand 42 
Therefore, identity is reducible to the question of what is good, whether this is expressed 
in spiritual, nationalistic, or even anarchistic tenns. This is not to suggest that people are 
always able to clearly articulate this framework. Situations do arise in which there may 
be "an acute form of disorientation, which people often express in tenns of not knowing 
who they are, but which can also be seen as a radical uncertainty of where they stand." 
An 'identity crisis', therefore, is much more about a loss of significance. 
Taylor therefore argues that this brings to light the essential link between identity and a 
kind of orientation: 
To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, space in which questions arise about 
what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for 











Far from simplistic reductionism, Taylor is also careful to indicate that our identities are 
complex and many-tiered. One is framed by what is seen as universally valid (like 
belonging to a specific religion) as well as by particular identifications (along 
nationalistic lines, for example). But "we often declare our identity as defined by only 
one of these, because this is what is salient in our lives, or what is put in question". 
Taylor's argument is premised on the fact that "the human agent exists in a space of 
questions. And these are the questions to which our framework-definitions are answers, 
providing the horizon within which we know where we stand, and what meanings things 
have for us". 44 
In summary, Taylor argues that "all human beings act within moral frameworks which 
enable them to make qualitative distinctions among goods. [ ... ] Commitment to certain 
"higher," or more basic, goods provide us with the capacity to locate ourselves, to 
establish an identity, and to determine the significance of various events or things for us. 
These "hypergoods" or "constitutive goods" [as Taylor calls them] may not be the same 
for everyone, but everyone must have some". 45 
For Taylor, "hypergoods" act as very important discriminatory tools that enable us to 
undertake "strong evaluations" involving "discriminations of right and wrong, better or 
worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations or 
choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be 
judged".46 What this means is that "to act within a moral framework is to act with a 











rest of one's views and choices", and as such, "we know who we are only by knowing 
where we stand". 47 
It thus becomes apparent that identity and morality go hand in hand. Embedded under 
what the individual regards as "hypergoods" is an accurate portrait of the self. The 
consequence of this discovery is the realisation that affirming certain goods necessarily 
involves discriminating against - or even rejecting - contrary conceptions of the good. 
This brings into serious question the pluralistic posturing so prevalent in contemporary 
philosophical discourse. It is therefore to proving the ultimate impossibility of moral 
relativism that we must now tum. 
3.3 The impossibility of moral relativism 
Taylor's thesis on hypergoods is potentially a serious source of conflict, as he openly 
acknowledges, simply because affirming what one regards as the "highest good" 
necessarily involves discriminating against 'lower goods': 
An ethical outlook organized around a hypergood [is] inherently conflictual and in tension. 
The highest good is not only ranked above the other recognized goods of society; it can in 
some cases challenge and reject them, as the principal of equal respect has been doing to the 
goods and virtues colUlected with traditional family life, as Judaism and Christianity did to 
the cults of pagan religions, and as the author of the Republic did to the goods and virtues of 
agonistic citizen life. And that is why recognizing a hypergood is a source of tension and of 











In response, Taylor acknowledges only two "extreme" strategies whereby all dilemmas 
can be avoided. The first is to deny entirely the credentials of any good that stands in the 
way of the hypergood. As opposed to this, the other possible strategy is to affirm all 
goods, which necessarily translates as a rejection of hypergoods.49 Taylor has 
compellingly argued the merits of hypergoods, viewing them as moral frameworks that 
form an integral component of the self and, therefore, to deny these frameworks is to 
effectively deny the moral agency of the self This is exactly what the second alternative 
implies, and exactly why Taylor is opposed to it. It affirms a moral relativism - or 
neutrality - that is simply not tenable. 
Affirming all goods - the second alternative - permeates much of contemporary 
philosophic thought. This mode of thought 
wants us to think of our moral reactions outside of any sense-making context, as on all fours 
with visceral reactions like nausea. On a more sophisticated level, we have the picture of 
values as projections on a neutral world, something which we normally though unconsciously 
live within but could perhaps abstain from.50 
The above perspective curnes much favour in postmodernist circles. "Derrida and 
Foucault want to disclaim any notion of the good. Certainly Nietszche rejected the 
Enlightenment ethic of benevolence, [although] it is much less clear that he rejected all 
accounts of the good".51 More specifically, Nietszche's offensive against hypergoods was 
mounted in an attempt to "break out of the whole form of thought he defined as 'moral', 











power.[ ... ] Neo·Nietszchean thinkers have extended this critique and tried to show how 
various forms of social exclusion and domination are built into the very definitions by 
which a hypergood perspective is constituted, as certain models of religious order 
excluded and dominated women, as ideals and disciplines of rational control excluded 
and dominated the lower classes (as well as women again), as definitions of health and 
fulfillment exclude and marginalise dissidents, as other notions of civilization exclude 
subject races, and so on". 52 
Taylor is able to rebut the neo·Nietszchean onslaught by drawing attention to the fact that 
their critiques do not ultimately disprove the notion of the hypergood, but simply replace 
one hypergood with another. For example, Derrida and Foucault are ultimately 
celebrating the potential freedom and power of the self when they disclaim any notion of 
the good; yet, as Taylor would have it, this is still a hypergood even if it passes 
remarkably unrecognised. s3 As he explains: "the very claim not to be oriented by a notion 
of the good is one which seems [ ... ] incredible [ ... ]. But it also reflects that the 
underlying ideal is some variant of that most invisible, because it is the most pervasive, 
of all modem goods, unconstrained freedom". 54 
Taylor thus dismisses the neo-Nietszchean perspective - along with that of its "empiricist 
cousins" - as "deeply implausible": 
The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are equally arbitrary, in 
particular that all moral views are equally so, is just not available to us humans. It is a form of 











right. This is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view we can put on 
or off. So the meta-construal of the neo-Nietszchean philosopher - 'in holding my moral 
position, I am imposing (or collaborating in the imposition of) a regime of truth on the chaos, 
and so does everyone' - is just as impossible as the meta-construal of the empiricist - 'in 
holding my moral position, I am projecting values on a neutral world of facts, and so does 
everyone'. Both are incompatible with the way we cannot but understand ourselves in the 
actual practices which constitute holding that position: our deliberations, our serious 
assessments of ourselves and others. They are not construals you could actually make of your 
life while living it. They clash, in other words, with the best available [BA) account of our 
moral life. And what meta-considerations can overrule our best account of our actual moral 
experience? The neo-Nietszchean position falls afoul of the BA principle, just as the crasser 
forms of naturalism do.55 
Because Taylor's analysis is ontological to the very core, he is able to effectively refute 
the more superficial accounts that assert positions of moral neutrality, simply by 
unmasking the moral biases inherent in such accounts. Ultimately, moral agency is 
undeniable - as has been argued earlier - because it is an integral component of the self. 
Our meandering journey along the ontological tum has thus far stressed the primacy of 
ontology over epistemology arguing that all ontologies ascribe modes of existence that 
relate directly to what is of ultimate concern to the knowing subject. We then drew 
attention to the influence of ontological self-perception upon human agency and morality 
arguing that similar to the case of epistemology, all moral actions also re-affirm a given 
ontology. The increasingly broader focus now requires that we examine the ontological 











Western-secular paradigm, so that we may finally begin developing a sense of the unique 
natures of each paradigm. Only then will we be able to authoritatively address the issue 
of Islamic authenticity once again, and finally grasp what understanding it in terms of 
ontological self-perception really entails. 
4. The Ontological Underpinnings oj Islam and Secularism 
Thus far no distinction has been drawn between identity and self-perception, even though 
the term identity has been utilised as a very conscious, well-articulated concept more akin 
to self-perception. However, on closer analysis it is not difficult to grasp that the term 
identity implies a strong social bearing, while self-perception is clearly suggestive of a 
very personal, inner feeling. It is therefore not improbable to argue that identity and self-
perception are "two different states of consciousness," as is suggested by the Turkish 
philosopher, Ahmet Davutoglu: 
Identity, in a relational sense, might be seen as a way of social recognition which needs two 
parties; while self-perception is purely a consciousness of individuality. An identity might be 
given or imposed by some authorities and therefore may be arbitrary and artificially 
dependent on other social and political factors [ ... ]. Self-perception necessarily implies an 
identity while the opposite is not always true. An identity might be transformed into a self-
perception only if it fits the authentic internalised elements of the personality.56 
This distinction is necessary in order to be able to compare and contrast the ontological 
underpinnings of Islamic and Western secular paradigms. When we speak about the 











as an identity that has internalised the authentic elements of these paradigms - and 
accurately reflects them - as a social or group identity. This in no way suggests the 
existence of a completely homogenous social collective with no dissenting strands, but 
rather emphasises the two paradigmatic cases so as to draw out their core distinctions and 
differences. 
Davutoglu pays considerable attention to the differences between Islam and Secularism 
from an ontological perspective. s7 We have thus far emphasised the importance of 
ontology in the personal sphere, that of articulating conceptions of the self and morality; 
Davutoglu stretches this importance even further. He argues - with specific regard to 
Muslim experience - that ontological existence lends itself to a more fruitful analysis if 
taken even further: 
Consciousness of ontological existence and of its meaning in the political and social sphere 
are the most critical issues if a comparison is to be made between the Islamic and Western 
tradition [ .. ,J. Ontological consciousness demands an understanding of the self in its triadic 
relations with God, the universe and other human beings. In pantheistic and materialistic 
worldviews, for example, there is an identification of God and the universe which conditions 
ontological consciousness of the self. Such an analysis of the dimensions of the ontological 
consciousness of the self provides the foundation for understanding the formative parameters 
of civilisational self-perception in Western and Islamic civilisations. The philosophical and 
political process of secularisation and its consequences are reflections of these imaginations 











Davutoglu thus conceives of the Western paradigm (which he equates with ontological 
proximity) and the Islamic paradigm (which he equates with absolute monotheism) as 
two alternative bases, reflecting two alternative modes of ontological consciousness that 
"directly influence the imaginative and theoretical link between ontological and socio-
political existence". 59 Each of these paradigms will now be examined individually. 
4.1 The Western paradigm: deification of the self 
The institutionalisation of economic and political systems represents a means of 
achieving what is essentially a fundamental human objective throughout history: the 
attainment of ontological security and freedom. 60 The western secular paradigm is but the 
most recent example of this perennial endeavor. Facilitating a lucid understanding of this 
paradigm requires a brief examination of the genesis of modem notions of freedom and 
the ensuing ontological implications. This will be followed by a critical assessment of 
some of the problems spawned by this paradigm. 
Modem notions of freedom are characteristically different from ancient conceptions that 
set a standard for us in nature, independent of our will, be it the Platonic notion of cosmic 
order or the Aristotelian concept of the good life. The modem notion, which developed in 
the seventeenth century, emphasises the independence of the subject, with freedom of 
purpose and no interference from an external authority.61 As Taylor explains: 
Late mediaeval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as being incompatible with 
there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. For that would be to tie 











thought even contributed in the end to the rise of mechanism: the ideal universe from this 
point of view is a mechanical one, without intrinsic purpose. But with the modem era, 
something analogous begins to be transferred onto humans. Normative orders must originate 
in the will.62 
This new conception of freedom arises from an "anthropological transfer of the 
prerogatives of God" as Taylor argues, and therefore, can be seen to represent the first 
steps towards deification of the self. The creative energies unleashed by 'self-deification' 
brought about significant institutional growth and reform. Even though such reforms 
impacted tremendously upon society, Davutoglu insightfully notes that the real 
transformatory character of this modem era was not institutional but rather imaginative -
as alluded to by Taylor - in that it represented a new cosmological, epistemological and 
ontological framework: 
This transformatory imagination fonned the conditions in the West which in turn brought 
about ontological freedom as expressed in the magical fonnula of "reason-science-progress" 
of the Age of Enlightenment. Reason was accepted as the source of ontological freedom, 
science as the material tool and fonn; and progress as the detenninistic future. So, western 
man deified himself and violated the authoritative character of the Christian concept of God 
and its institutionalized doctrine. Liberalism was the ideological guarantee for this concept of 
freedom while the Industrial Revolution was its material reflection as a tremendous 
"success". The feeling in the fIrst phase of industrial revolution that man could control 
everything through his new slaves, namely machines, accelerated the prescientism of the idea 
of unilinear progress in that human beings would enjoy a paradise of absolute freedom in the 











the 19th century. This Euro·Christian psychology of a secular paradise on earth was the 
motivating impetus for colonialism.63 
That the root paradigms of Western secularism are imaginative and not institutional 
cannot be over-emphasised. Its two support pi1Iars - "ontological proximity" and 
"particularisation" - must now be further elaborated upon.64 Davutoglu explains that 
particularisation of divinity in ancient mythology and Christian theology, led ultimately 
to a proximity and identification on the ontological level between God, man and nature.6S 
Any conceptualisation of the divine (whether as inanimate idol, Trinitarian divinity, or 
force of nature) that ultimately compromises the absolute uniqueness of a God that 
transcends all, is rendered malleable. Such a conception is within the reach of the human 
imagination, which easily transforms it as it pleases, since the divide between self-
conception and the divine is not really that wide. It is therefore the ontological proximity 
so firmly rooted within the Western paradigm through particularisation of the divine that 
ultimately facilitated the transition from an external divinity to the deification of the self. 
This was obviously effected over a considerable period of time so a brief exploration of 
this evolution is well warranted at this point. 
The idea of God forms the core of Western religion, representing a centre of being or 
presence around which a series of subcentres orbit, functioning to hold the ultimate 
centre in place.66 The human agent is a perfect example of a subcentre because the 
believer acknowledges and affirms the presence of the divine as the centre of being. 
However, the de-centering of the divine, i.e., the shifting of presence from beyond the 











evolution from belief in God to self-deification or unbelief This process of de-centering 
- the journey from the affirmation of presence to its ultimate denial - can be traced in the 
evolution of thought from St Augustine, to Descartes, to Derrida. 
Taylor draws to our attention the importance of the Augustinian tradition in the tum 
"inward" and its impact upon Cartesian thought.67 For Augustine, presence of the divine 
is acknowledged through the individual's recognition of a lack of self-sufficiency. 
Through this recognition the person comes to see more and more that God acts within 
him. Therefore for Augustine, "the path inward was only a step on the way upward".68 
Although the Augustinian tradition takes the reflexive tum in no uncertain tenns, it still 
very strongly affirms the position of God at the centre of being and the individual as a 
sub centre that acknowledges the divine presence. A very important transposition of this 
tradition takes place in Descartes' thought. 
As Taylor notes, Descartes also proves the existence of God starting from the self-
understanding of the thinking agent, but with an extremely important contrast. In the 
Cartesian construct the "whole point of the reflexive tum is to achieve a quite self-
sufficient certainty".69 While it must be acknowledged that the chain of reasoning shows 
that the individual does rely on a veracious God for his/her knowledge of the external 
world, there is still a notable difference from the traditional Augustinian order of 
dependence: 
The thesis is not that I gain knowledge when turned towards God in faith. Rather the certainty 











mther that God's existence has become a stage in my progress towards science through the 
methodical ordering of evident insight. God's existence is a theorem in my system of perfect 
science. The centre of gmvity has decisively shifted.70 
This then, is the crucial step: the evolution from the Augustinian paradigm to the 
Cartesian one involves a decisive shifting of the centre from the transcendent to the self. 
As a result, divine presence is subverted by self-presence. As Taylor explains: 
The step from the imperfect self to a perfect God, so essential1y Augustinian in its source, is 
in the process of mutating into something else. It is not carried out so as to make God appear 
at the very roots of the self, closer than my own eye. On the contrary, it is the sure inforence, 
from powers that I can become quite certain of possessing, to their inescapable source. The 
Cartesian proof is no longer a search for an encounter with God within. It is no longer the 
way to an experience of everything in God. Rather what I now meet is myself: I achieve a 
clarity and a fullness of self-presence that was lacking before.71 
The effect of this self-presence was not an immediate rejection of God, but rather the 
emergence of a conception of God that very much depended on reason. As Taylor 
expresses it, the road to Deism was at this point opened, even if not yet taken. But the 
path not taken was to become well-worn in the modem period, etching out its own radical 
branch: "this new conception of inwardness, an inwardness of self-sufficiency, of 
autonomous powers of ordering by reason, also prepared the ground for modem 
unbelief,.72 With the onset of Derridian analysis we finally encounter denial of the 
possibility of presence. This assertion is boldly conveyed in Derrida's now infamous 











asserts, is nothing more than the determination of "Being as presence".74 His repudiation 
of anything beyond the texti is essentially a rejection of 'being as presence'. It is an 
attempt to show that "it is only the text that speaks, not some prior and external origin or 
presence". 75 
The transition from external divinity to self-deification through particularisation of the 
divine can be summed up as follows: The metaphysics of presence asserts a centre of 
authority, a source of meaning and significance, whereas self-presence divests all 
authority from an external source and places it in the hands of the knowing subject; the 
denial of presence altogether challenges the very notion of authority. This final step in the 
evolution of the Western ontological paradigm is what ultimately leads to crisis; the 
deified-self has to face the reality of its own limits, and therefore question its own 
divinity. 
Davutoglu admits that secularisation contains a strong egalitarianist slant due to its 
elimination of the semi-divine ontological category of the clergy. However, he also 
emphatically insists that as a consequence of ontological proximity this category was able 
to continue in secular form: 
In short, God died in secularIWestem imagination, but semi-divine or super-human beings 
continued to survive either as an ontologico-theological or as an ontologico-philosophical 
image.76 
i It must be noted that the tenn "text" is employed here as a metaphor of that which signifies an external 
locus. Therefore, just as the literary text implies the existence of an author, nature could be viewed as a 











He thus asserts that the myth of Narsissus' worship of his own appearance has been 
reinvented as a new pure form of secular ontology. This secular ontology, however, must 
confront two major dilemmas. The first has been alluded to above: "the inner clash 
between narcissistic self-assertion and the limits of physical capability".77 Davutoglu 
explains that ontological insecurity arises when the narcissist confronts the frustration of 
observing the clash between his/her superego and the physical limits of the setf. 
The second dilemma of secular ontology concerns the legitimacy of moral values and 
impacts more on society than on the self. As Davutoglu explains, "objective moral values 
lose their binding character when they are linked to the narcissistic self-perception of the 
subject who wants to maximise his ontological security and freedom. So, this narcissistic 
self-perception creates its own threat and anxiety. A moral dearth becomes inevitable as a 
consequence of this dilemma".78 Society suffers as a result because - as Davutoglu 
explains - discrimination, racism and ethnic cleansing can only be justified by means of a 
narcissistic self-perception: 
The concepts of 'chosen nation', 'white man's burden', 'west-rest', 'white-black' are all 
reflections of the subject-oriented and value-free self-identity of secular ontology: the 
ultimate version of ontological proximity. This is the most fundamental dilemma of the 
secular foundations of West em democmcies.79 
Having explored the Western paradigm and its underlying mode of ontological 












4.2 The Islamic paradigm: absolute monotheism 
The critical divergence between the Islamic and Western traditions is effected by the 
absence of the two support pillars that hold up Western secularism, namely ontological 
proximity and particularisation. These two root paradigms are alien to Muslim 
ontological consciousness and self-perception.80 Davutoglu attributes this absence to the 
absolute monotheistic character of the Islamic belief system which 
prevented ontological proximity and the emergence of any intermediary ontological category 
[ ... ]. In Islamic ontological consciousness neither church nor state can have divine status as 
an intermediary ontological category. Equally, there also cannot be absolute ontological 
particularisation among divine beings with its reflection in socio-political separation [ ... ] 
between church and state.8l 
The Islamic paradigm is characterised by a hierarchy in which the internal consistency of 
its belief structure and its social reflections are "natural consequences of the 
interdependent relationship between the imaginations of being (ontology), knowledge 
(epistemology), value (axiology) and institutions (social cosmology).82 The religious and 
historic experience of Muslim societies - Davutoglu explains - are attributable to fOU~i 
significant counterparts to the Islamic paradigm of ontological hierarchy and unity: 
first, the direct, well-defined, easily understandable ontological and epistemological 
relationship between God and man in the form of a revealed text; second, the rationallhurnan 












tradition of the re-interpretation of this revelation through a methodology of individual and 
collective rationality embodied in the consensus of the community; third, the historicity of 
both the revealed text and the religious leadership of prophecy; and fourth, a finn link 
between the ontological and socio-political levels of existence of the individual. The four 
factors fonn the basis of a rational legitimation process in Islamic civilisation. which 
prevented both the emergence of a sacred clergy and consequently secular exclusion of 
religion.83 
Another significant departure from the Western paradigm is Islam's unique 
understanding of freedom. Both traditions conceive understandings of freedom from their 
conceptions of the self, but because of the marked difference between the Islamic and 
Western imagination, the resultant notions of freedom are also very different. As 
Dawtoglu explains, " the Qur)anic conceptualization and specification of the ontological 
status of man in his relationship with Allah as the Creator and nature as the environment 
of existence influences both the individual consciousness as well as the man-man 
relationship in social life". 84 It is this self-perception that directly influences the Islamic 
concept of ontological security and freedom: 
Freedom within the Islamic framework is not power-dependent but a natural state of 
consciousness. Therefore, it is neither merely a relative phenomenon of being equal or 
superior to others nor an outcome of the power struggle for the exploitation of natural forces 
by artificial mechanisms. It is basically a spiritual subject of the self-conscious being. The 
ontological security can only be achieved if this spirituality of freedom becomes a social 
fonn of ethics. Belief is not the dogma of an institutionalized power like the church because 
the Holy Qur'an addresses itself to each individual being rather than to a selected nation or 











This very brief but important exposition of the Islamic and Western secular paradigms 
very strongly reflects the irreconcilability of both the philosophical and theoretical bases 
of these two alternative world views. Davutoglu succinctly captures the main contrasting 
features of the two paradigms as follows: 
The originality of the Islamic paradigm is related to its theocentric ontology based on the 
belief of tawhid [monotheism} supported by the principle of tanzih [transcendence}. The 
differentiation of ontological levels via ontological hierarchy and ontologically defined 
epistemology are the cornerstones of the process from its imago mundi to the axiological 
foundations of political images and culture. The Western paradigm around proximity of 
ontological levels through a particularisation of divinity supported by intrinsically polytheist 
and pantheist elements, is the philosophical origin of the secularisation of life via rationalistic 
axiology. This is a specific character of the Western philosophical tradition based on 
epistemologically-defined ontology which has led to a relativised and subjectivised religion.86 
We have argued earlier - in the discussion on the epistemological tum - that a major 
shortcoming of the Western philosophical tradition has been the tremendous emphasis 
placed upon epistemology. Davutoglu obviously concurs with this view as is apparent 
from his belief that it leads to a "relativised and subjectivised religion." Therefore, much 
of our analysis has been concerned with emphasising the importance of ontological 
underpinnings, which serve as a far truer benchmark for comparison. 
The entire purpose of such a close examination of both paradigms is not to stress their 











takes us back to the question of authenticity once again. We began by stating what 
authenticity is not and it is now necessary to finally express what authenticity is. 
5. Defining Islamic Authenticity 
The most important consequence of ignoring the ontological underpinnings of 
contemporary discourse has been the prevailing tendency to underplay notions of 
authentic and original culture and identity. Contemporary social theorists like Trinh 
Minh-Ha, Paul Gilroy, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall all claim that the 
individuals' daily interactions constitute their cultural expressions.87 For example, Khan 
demonstrates that Bhabha's notion of hybridised subjectivity in the third space is an 
attempt to explain how individuals negotiate the contradictory demands and polarities of 
their lives: 
By disrupting the concept of original and homogenous culture, Bhabha's theory of third 
space unsettles a pattern of meaning constituted in serial time and challenges the articulation 
of culture as a homogenizing uni.fYing force authenticated by the originary past and kept alive 
in the national tradition of the people. Instead Bhabha points out that individuals construct 
their culture from national as well as religious texts and often transform them into Western 
symbols, signifiers of technology, language, or dress. 88 
Bhabha is correct in challenging the notion of homogenous culture and in suggesting that 
authenticity is not only something located in what is described above as "the originary 
past." He is also correct in suggesting that identity is multi-faceted. However, he misses 











marker of identity. As has been alluded to earlier, it is our ultimate concerns that 
determine who we are. Identity has thus become the key issue of our times and cannot be 
underplayed or disguised by opaque notions like Bhabha's "hybridised subjectivity." The 
centrality of identity is made apparent by the fact that institutions and individuals no 
longer speak only from within the narratives of nation, since their landscape and 
networks of life have shifted beyond the nation state and are influenced by the different 
modalities of globalisation processes within which such discourses are articulated.89 A 
prime example is how Islamic authenticity is cogently articulated in the context where 
Muslims have migrated to the West, and where Islam has become a source of identity 
formation. 90 
A second strand in contemporary thought attempts to equate authenticity with authority. 
Such an equation has a strong element of truth to it but is also potentially problematic. A 
religious tradition, for example, would ideally not have to compel its adherents to submit 
to its requirements since they accept its teachings and strive to embody them. In this 
instance authority emanates from authenticity. The equation however becomes 
problematic when religious authenticity is viewed simply as a function of state power, for 
example. 91 Equating authenticity with state authority in such a blatant manner is 
tantamount to denying individual agency. This criticism should not however be 
understood as a denial of the possible bias of the state towards a certain world view, 
religious tradition, or ideology. What is strongly being rejected is the denial of a 











Such misconceptions arise only because of the failure to recognise that authenticity is 
about the uniqueness of being, bound by time/space.92 This was alluded to earlier by 
suggesting that authenticity must be understood in terms of ontological self-perception. 
We must now explain this in sufficient detail. Much of what has been said thus far has 
been directed with this objective in mind. 
With regards to Islam, Davutoglu points out that it has had to confront three significant 
civilisational challenges in its history, namely the Crusades, the Mongol invasion, and the 
colonial expansion of Western civilisation.93 He notes that the first two challenges were 
military threats that may have destroyed elements of the physical and written legacy of 
Islam, but the main spiritual, intellectual and cultural parameters continued to survive in 
strengthened form. However, the European challenge in the modern era, and its political 
consequences in the form of the international colonial system represented a challenge in 
all spheres, and therefore, a threat to Islamic authenticity. 
Secularisation in Western civilisation has redefined the ontological and historic stance which 
guarantees the continuity of civilisational substance. The autocratic transfer of this process to 
non-Western societies, on the other hand, has destroyed the traditional stance without 
replacing it with a new one. Thus, the most critical aspect of the process of secularisation is 
the impact on the stance of an individual human being related to his self-consciousness 
(ontological existence) and to his time-consciousness (historical existence) [ ... J. Autocratic 
modernisation strategies tried to impose on the masses a new self-consciousness and time-
consciousness through institutional, political, economic and educational machinery. This has 
exacerbated the question of the 'divided self in the sphere of self-consciousness and the 











authentic civilisations is, in fact, a natural response to restore a 'new stance' which proves the 
ontological and historical existentiality of non-Western humanity94 
As such, most of what has been argued thus far may be viewed as an exercise in retrieval. 
I have articulated how the individual self is conceptualised in terms of its ultimate 
concerns, and then compared and contrasted two portraits of the self that are essentially 
the products of different world views. This comparison reflects the tensions that exist 
between the dominant Western paradigm and other muted alternatives - like the Islamic 
paradigm - that are struggling to assert themselves. This in itself shows that at the very 
core of what we regard as authentic is an image of the self, shaped by our higher moral 
ideals.95 
However, there is one final consideration that has to be addressed: why is the self defined 
in terms of values or morals that emanate from beyond, and not just in terms of its own 
desires? In this regard Taylor draws attention to differentiating between "authentic moral 
contact with ourselves" and "self-determining freedoms." The first implies, among other 
things, that "I am free to do what I want without interference by others because that is 
compatible with my being shaped and influenced by society and its laws of conformity"; 
the second "demands that I break the hold of all such external impositions, and decide for 
myself alone". 96 The crucial difference between authenticity and self-determining 
freedoms is that the latter "implicitly denies the existence of a pre-existing horizon of 
significance, whereby some things are worthwhile and others less so, and still others not 
at all, quite anterior to choice". 97 As Taylor so lucidly points out, the general lesson is 











Even the sense that the significance of my life comes from its being chosen - the case where 
authenticity is actually grounded on self-determining freedom - depends on the 
understanding that independent of my will there is something noble, courageous, and hence 
significant in giving shape to my own life [ ... J. Unless some options are more significant 
than others, the very idea of self-.choice falls into triviality and hence incoherence.98 
All of this makes sense in light of what has been argued earlier. In order to live 
meaningful and significant lives we have to exist in a horizon of important questions, that 
is, we have to consider what is of ultimate importance to us. Taylor affirms this by noting 
that to shut out demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions 
of significance, and hence to court trivialisation. 
Otherwise put, I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But 
to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in 
myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters. Only if I exist in a world in 
which history, or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the 
duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order matters crucially, can 
I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that 
emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands.99 
Very simply stated then, Islamic authenticity refers to the ideal Muslim self-image, 
shaped by the eternal morals and values of the Islamic belief system. Understanding 
authenticity in terms of ontological self-perception therefore accords primacy to the 












In this chapter I have argued that in order to understand the foundations of any given 
intellectual discourse primacy must be given to ontological concerns because they 
permeate all aspects of human existence. So-called 'empirical' epistemologies are not 
value-free because even they conceal implicit ontologies that - when uncovered - reveal 
the biases and preferences of the human agent. Therefore, ontology impacts just as much 
upon science as it does upon morality. 
Focus has been concentrated more on the role of ontology in human agency. I have 
argued that there is a direct relationship between conceptions of the self and moral action, 
and that moral choices affirm a given ontology. By then exploring the ontological 
underpinnings of Western and Islamic paradigms I have tried to show that they differ due 
to the different ways in which they conceive of the self, and, as such, spawn very 
different worldviews. We are consequently presented with two very different, but 
nonetheless, authentic ideals. As has been noted earlier the Islamic authentic ideal has 
been marginalised and challenged by the more dominant Western-secular ideal. What is 
of central importance, though, is that both these ideals are shaped by concerns that 
emanate beyond the self. 
We are now in a position to explore the source of the Islamic ideal, to explain the role the 
Qur)an plays in shaping the ontological self-perception of its interlocutors. Only then will 
be able to understand its role as foundational text. This then, in brief, is the task we face 
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(Allah) Most Gracious! The One Who has Taught the Qur'iin, Who has created Humankind, 
has taught [them] speech (and intelligence). - The Holy Qur)an (Ch. 55: v. 1 - 4)1 
Sa'd b. Hisham said: I went to cA.'isha and said, "Mother of the faithful, teU me about the 
nature of God's messenger." She asked, "Do you not recite the Qu~an?" On my replying that 
I certainly did, she said, "The Prophet's nature was the Quran" - <A?isha Bint Abi Bakr.2 
The self neither preexists all conversation, as in the old monological view; nor does it arise 
from the introjection of the interlocutor; but it arises within conversation, because this kind of 
dialogical action by its very nature marks a place for the new locator who is being inducted 
into it. - Charles Taylor? 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter the foundational text as metaphor must finally confront the foundational 
text as scripture. The Qurlan as scripture is not only revered in Islam as being divinely 
inspired, but also acknowledged as the ultimate beacon, serving as guide in the perennial 
quest for self-fulfillment. As such, the ideal Islamic attitude towards the Qurlan can best 
be described as one that conflates foundational text as metaphor with foundational text as 
scripture. The opening epigraphs are strongly suggestive of this and provide a useful 
thumb sketch of the path along which this chapter will proceed. 
The verses quoted above open with the mention of God, followed by the Qurlan that has 











Careful consideration of the Qur)anic Weltanschauung affirms that this is by no means a 
random statement of expression. Embedded within these four pithy verses is the entire 
metaphysical hierarchy of Islam. Understanding this hierarchy is the key to solving the 
problem of the metaphysical status of values in the Islamic tradition. Only once this is 
grasped will we be able to make sense of the Qur)an as foundational text. 
Therefore, one of the objectives of this chapter is to demonstrate that from an Islamic 
perspective the status of right and wrong is necessarily ontological. The committed 
Muslim does not create his or her own system of ethics, but submits to the moral dictates 
of God as expressed in the Qur)an. This engaged submission is poignantly captured in the 
lived practice of the Prophet of Islam. As is related by his wife (A'isha above, the Prophet 
was a living embodiment of the Qur)anic ethic, and it is in this sense that Muslims aspire 
to imitate him, regarding his personality as the perfect model for emulation. 
The challenge, then, is to engage and understand the Qur'anic ethic, and strive to live by 
it. The question as to how this is achieved obviously arises. Responding to this concern is 
another central aim of this chapter. It will be argued that the Qur'anic self-image is 
inculcated in the person through a dialogic process. Charles Taylor's comments above 
help facilitate our understanding of this process. Taylor cogently demonstrates that we -
as moral subjects - are created in conversation. On this basis I will argue that the 











The previous chapter had focused on the role of ontology in human agency, arguing that 
moral choices affirm a certain ontology or state of being-in-the-world. It was also argued 
that Islamic authenticity has to be understood in terms of ontological self-perception. 
Therefore the main task of this chapter is to demonstrate how the Qur)an - which is the 
primary source of the Islamic ideal - informs the ontological self-perception of its 
interlocutors. 
In this chapter I will therefore proceed in the next section with a discussion on the role of 
the Qur)an as foundational text. This entails elaborating upon the early status of the 
Qur'an as the primary source of all values and the later subversion of this primacy, due to 
various reasons. A brief account of the displacement of the Qur'an as foundational text is 
an absolute prerequisite to the central discussion on its re-emergence as the definitive 
ontological blueprint for Islamic ethics. This, then, will be the main focus of attention in 
the section that follows. 
Any understanding of the relationship between the Qur'an and ethical ontology must be 
predicated upon an inquiry into the status, role, and influence of speculative metaphysics 
in the Islamic tradition. This is the purpose of the third section of this chapter. In the 
previous chapter I have argued that one or another ontology is the only adequate basis for 
our moral responses. In this chapter I will elaborate on this position and demonstrate that 
for the nascent Muslim community the metaphysical status of right and wrong was 
necessarily ontological. It was only through the later influence of speculative metaphysics 











contemporary philosophers in order to justify such ontological commitment in light of 
current trends in philosophy. 
Arguing for the recognition of ethics as the only fixed ontological category in the Islamic 
value system requires addressing the permanent, fixed, or ahistorical aspects of Islamic 
discourse in relation to changing, in-flux, or historical aspects. Far from advocating a 
literal application of revelation insensitive to contextual or cultural factors, it will be 
argued in the fourth section that a system of ethics founded on onto logically rigid moral 
categories is flexible enough to adapt to ever-changing social realities. Once the 
boundaries of permanence and change have been established, we will be able to consider 
their implications upon the Qur'an as foundational text. 
The final section, therefore, will elaborate upon the role of the foundational text in the 
construction of the Ideal-Self. It will be argued that the human agent is predisposed to the 
ethical teachings of the Qur'an through a process of interlocution. This dialogical 
relationship is a dynamic mechanism through which the person engages the ontological 
blueprint of values embedded within the Qur'an. The level to which these values resonate 
within the individual-self is the final determinant of whether the person submits to the 
message of revelation or not. This process will be dealt with sufficiently in the last 











2. The Quran as Foundational Text 
The onset of Islam is best characterised as a moment of irruption brought about by the 
event of the Qur'an. Muslims generally refer to the Qur'an as the Holy Book or Scripture. 
Its impact upon history bears testimony to an influence that not only gave rise to a 
community of faithful, but defined an extremely deep and meaningful mode or existence 
as well. The nascent community, nurtured under the profound influence of the Qur'an, 
grew into an empire that dominated world history for a significant period, spawning a 
civilisation that till today sustains and inspires people to embrace Islam as a response to 
ultimate concerns. The Qur'an of the first generation, therefore, acted as foundational text 
in a sense synonymous with a grand or master narrative that informed all levels of 
existence, both sacred and profane. 
It is in this penetrating sense that Fazlur Rahman refers to the revelations inspired to 
Muhammad as "the voice from the depths of life, speaking distinctly, unmistakably and 
imperiously".4 The assertive power of the Qur'an is not simply attributable to the belief 
concerning its divine origins. As Rahman explains, God's existence, as far as the Qur'an 
is concerned, is strictly functional because it is not a treatise about God or His nature. S 
Humanity is the central concern of the Qur'an, as it is either directly addressed to humans 
or is a discourse on human existence.6 This very important attribute conveys upon the 












From this perspective, a Muslim is simply one who submits to the teachings of the Qur'an 
and affirms its authority. The Qur'anic philosophy resonated strongly within the very 
beings of the Muslims of the first generation in this manner and thereby gave impetus to 
their spiritual and social existence.7 In this formative period the event of the Qur'an 
became the focal point of intellectual activity even amongst those who were not 
reconciled to its message. Any opposing inclination was invariably drawn into dialogue 
with the voice of revelation and the Qur'an thus maintained a central position in the mind 
of the community.8 
The Qur'an thus occupied the most privileged of positions in the hearts and minds of the 
believers and could deservedly be accorded the status of foundational text, seeing that it 
served to inform and inspire all aspects of life. Al-Nashar elaborates on the centrality of 
the Qur'an (in the formative period at least), arguing that the beginnings of Islamic 
thought may be traced back to the deep reflection effected by the Qur'an. As such, 
Islamic Existence in its entirety is nothing but an elaboration of the Qur'iin. Pondering over 
the practical stipulations of the Qur>iin gave rise to jurisprudence; reflecting over it as a writ 
on metaphysics led to the development of dialectic theology; contemplating over it as a book 
[concerned with] the hereafter gave rise to mysticism, spirituality and ethics; deliberating 
over it as a book of laws gave rise to the science of governance; regarding its language as 
divine inspired the linguistic sciences, and so forth. The development of all the Islamic 
sciences should be approached from this perspective. They sprung forth and developed from 
the Qur'iinic purview and confronted the sciences of other cultures from this very same 











However, in spite of the tremendous impact of the Qur'an upon the earlier generations, 
history also bears stark testimony to the dwindling of its power to influence. Various 
factors contributed towards the displacement of the Qur'an from its position of centrality 
within the Muslim psyche. Although there always were - and are still - many individuals 
who strove to walk in the shadow of the divine revelation, the shift from a Qur'an that 
was completely internalised to one that was now somehow external to the Muslim-Self 
was gradually effected over time. The conception of Qur'an as scripture slowly gained 
ascension over the initial impact of the Divine Voice directly experienced as an 
existential imperative. At this juncture the status of the Qur'an as foundational text could 
critically be brought into question. Various influences, intellectual, social and political, 
impacted upon Islamic thought in a manner that compromised the ethical imperative of 
the Qur'an. 10 
The role or specific impact of certain influences over others remains debatable, but what 
is of utmost importance is bearing in mind that it was most definitely overriding concerns 
such as power, the creation of a community, and the maintenance of an Islamic Political 
order that led to the dislocation of the Qur'anic ethical imperative from the ultimate 
concerns of the Muslim community. In a more philosophical vein, it may be argued that 
the transitory ends and objectives of those in power in the Muslim community was able 
to displace the envisioned teleology of the Qur'an so firmly embedded in the hearts and 
minds of the first-generation Muslims. It is this loss, more than any other, that was 












Fazlur Rahman, more than any other modern scholar, has been primarily concerned with 
recovering the ethical imperative of the Qur'an. It is thus worth considering some of the 
reasons he puts forward for its loss, even if they are in some instances debatable. My 
concern is merely to clarify how the Qur'anic ideal came to be subverted before going on 
to argue for the re-emergence of the Qur'an as foundational text in contemporary times. 
Rahman has himself lamented the absence of a Qur'an-centreed ethics in most of his 
works, outlining the reasons for this loss so as to facilitate its recovery. II 
His last work, published posthumously, explores how various sects within Islam deviated 
from the Qur)anic ideal. 12 Most of his attention is directed to the Mur}T'ah, who attempted 
to take a neutral stance in the political and theological conflicts of the early Muslim 
community by withholding moral judgement. Rahman contends that this position in the 
end permeated the entire moral fabric of the community, having the disastrous effect of 
ethically desensitising Muslims: 
Mainstream Islamic theology, represented in the )Asilcari and Miitiiridi schools, propagated 
irjii' [lit. postponement but signifying withholding of judgement] and made it the official 
doctrine. $iifism, especially the pantheistic variety propagated by Ibn (Arabi, made an even 
more far reaching contribution to this moral blindness and decline. While irjii' taught in 
effect that no sin no matter how grave could put a person beyond the pale, $iifism destroyed 
the distinction between good and evil altogether.13 
In addition to the ~Ofis and the Murj'f'ah, Rahman is also critical of sects like the 











thesis to anti- Qur'anic extremes when they denied any role to God whatsoever in the 
sphere of human moral action. "Similarly, they pushed their thesis of divine justice to 
such extremes that they denuded God of the power to forgive sinners,,!4 Rahman is 
especially harsh in his denouncement of Shri attitudes to the Qur'an: 
The Shiq through the centuries showed little regard for the Qur1in, despite producing a large 
number of commentaries. They have especially wrought havoc with their ecstatic and 
allegorical interpretations. The truth is while the Sunnis have imperceptibly but surely 
receded from the Qur1in and the real legacy of the Prophet, the Shiq have cast the Qur'an into 
systematic oblivion, and both disrupted and distorted the real legacy of Muhammad. But once 
the Imam is removed, what is left except the dry bones of the law and the intellectual husk 
that is kallim theology, which are common in both traditions. In the final analysis the only 
justification for the Shiq as a separate entity is purely negative: their anti-Sunnism.15 
Rahman is thus categorical in his condemnation of any perceived deviation from the 
Qur'anic ideal, thereby advocating a very precise conceptualisation of authentic Islam. He 
alludes to this in one of his earlier works where the Qur'an and Sunnah are referred to as 
normative anchoring points. Not even the Sharrah or divine law, which modern scholars 
generally equate with correct Islam is to be accorded normative standing. T~e Sharrah 
has only a derivative status - both in concept and content - because it is purportedly 
deduced from the Qur'an and Sunnah. Even less credible in terms of normativity is what 
some "learned Muslims" may believe to be "correct Islam," as such advocacy can only 











opinions. Therefore, authentic Islam can only be judged by the normative standards of the 
Qur'an and Sunnah. 16 
Another very compelling explanation for the subversion of the Qur'an as foundational 
text is proffered by Ismacil Raji al-Faruqi. Al-Faruqi attributes the declining influence of 
the Qur'anic Ideal to the failure of Arabization maintaining pace with Islamization. As a 
result, 
the Qur:.a.nic meanings came to be less and less the object of an intuitive grasp and immediate 
understanding, and more and more that of a conceptualizing sense-empiricism in doubt about 
the new message which shattered its old pre-Islamic world-view. Compared with the Arab or 
fully-Arabized mind, this mind was incapable offully grasping the idea of transcendence and 
of appreciating the necessarily-human, necessarily-conceptual and necessarily-aesthetic 
(poetic) language in which the transcendent may be expressed or talked about. But where the 
transcendent or the Qur:.a.nic meanings pertaining thereto are not object of an immediate 
intuition, they became irrational stumbling blocks. 17 
This blurred, non-Arab consciousness thus fell victim to mediated understandings of key 
Qur'linic doctrinal concepts, opening the door for foreign influences - as al-Faruqi argues 
- especially from the religions of Persia and India, or from the Jahwasim of those Jews 
who thought of their God in excessively human terms. 
The common factor alluded to by both Rahman and al-Fliruqi is the diminishing influence 











suggest that the Voice of revelation was at any stage altogether absent, but rather that 
cultural and intellectual accretions served to effectively muffle it, rendering it rather 
inarticulate. In light of such multiplicity of influence, Amina Wadud argues that the Islam 
of the Primary Sources (Le. the Qur)an and the Sunnah) along with the intellectual legacy 
built upon these sources and the cultural specificities of Muslims from diverse 
backgrounds resulted in extremely complex configurations: 
Between scholars of Islam and Muslim laity, notions of Islam are sometimes haphazardly 
drawn from all three levels. No distinction is made between the "Islam" defined through 
cultural nuance and a wide range of Muslim practices.IS 
Wadud therefore rhetorically asks whether "Islam" is what Muslims do, what 
governments establish, what the intellectual legacy articulated, or what the primary 
sources imply? This is very much in keeping with Muslim aspirations that have always 
viewed Islam as an effort to establish a moral community based on the tenets of the 
Divine Revelation. As one sympathetic voice puts it: "The Muslim moral community is 
founded on the assumption that the ultimate source of moral knowledge is God and that 
God has revealed His Will, for the last time, through the Prophet in the [Qur)an]" ,19 
The re-emergence of the Quran as foundational text thus aims at the recovery of the 
moral knowledge inspired by God. This necessitates inquiring into the status of values or 











3. The Qur'an, Speculative Metaphysics and Ethical Ontology 
It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that traditional metaphysics involved 
exploring the idea of the separate reality as a possible field of inquiry, and that ontology 
was initially regarded as a branch of metaphysics. Immanuel Kant ushered in a new era in 
modern philosophy with his critique of metaphysics as a possible field of human inquiry. 
The entire classical edifice was brought into question when Kant pronounced that "all our 
knowledge undoubtedly begins with (human) experience".20 It could thus be fairly 
straightforwardly concluded that since our sensory experience does not encompass the 
metaphysical realm, all speculative knowledge about it is impossible. Kant's critique 
played an integral role in displacing the primacy of ontology in philosophical thought, 
replacing it with epistemology. Much of the last chapter dealt with reasserting the 
primacy of ontology. It was argued that in the modern period a crucial shift in the 
function of metaphysics was effected, resulting in focus being shifted to the essential 
structure of our thought while still maintaining its primary ontological function by 
exploring issues of being and existence. 21 I will return to the importance of this 
development later, but for now we must explore the implications of Kant's critique. 
How, then, is one to address extremely compelling metaphysical issues such as God, 
knowledge, being, freedom, truth, and - of immediate concern to us - ethics? Kant 
argued that we are able to confront that which is beyond our senses by the use of reason. 
He thus exhorted the a priori nature of the moral law and sought to establish it as a "fact 
of reason".22 This is a position that is still partially favored today, but the most recent 











'good' has no proper definition as opposed to by what means one may be able to define 
the 'good,?3 
It is by no means an exaggeration to contend that developments in the Islamic tradition 
proceeded in exactly the reverse order. Al-Nashar explicates that because the Qur'an is a 
source of guidance to all of humankind it is only natural that it would outline principles 
for speculation and thought in addition to directives pertaining to practical life. 24 The 
Qur'an does address general principles of metaphysics, of which ethical issues are an 
integral part and as such sufficiently prioritised. Al-Nashar explains that the Qur'an calls 
for the recognition of what he refers to as reconcilable and irreconcilable realities~ the 
latter being in reference to (metaphysical) issues lying beyond the scope of the intellect 
and the former referring to issues within its reach?5 The QurJanic position on the 
metaphysical realm as a possible field of inquiry is therefore one of categorical 
denouncement.26 The entire purpose of revelation is to indeed address metaphysical 
issues of concern to human existence, which al-Nashar has labeled as irreconcilable 
realities. If ethical issues could for example be effectively resolved by the intervention of 
reason - as Kant suggests - then revelation would necessarily be redundant. 
As has been alluded to earlier, unfolding trends in Islamic thought resulted in a shift away 
from the QurJanic ethos so completely internalised by the first generation, thereby 
opening the door to speculative metaphysics. Al-Nashar attributes both internal and 
external factors to the rise of speculative metaphysics in Islam, regarding the external 











precise factors as we are with exploring their effects. Before exploring the effects of 
metaphysical speculation, a few words need to be said about the nature of Qur'anic 
ethics. 
Majid Fakhry's seminal study on Ethical Theories in Islam provides an in depth analysis 
of the development of ethical theories within the tradition, and as is to be expected, his 
point of departure is the Qur'an. Although he begins from the premise that the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah (Prophetic Traditions) embody the original core of the Islamic ethical spirit, 
he explicitly states that they do not contain any ethical theories in the strict sense.28 
Ethical theories proper only appear formally in the eighth and ninth centuries. Fakhry 
categorises them under four rubrics, i.e., a) scriptural morality, b) theological theories, c) 
philosophical theories, and finally d) religious theories. All of these theories, with the 
exception of the philosophical, are to a greater or lesser extent grounded in the teachings 
of the Qur'an and Sunnah. The philosophical theories stem ultimately from the writings 
of Plato and Aristotle.29 It is of central importance to recognise that none of these theories 
can truly be regarded as being exclusively representative of the Qur'anic ethical 
imperative since they all developed in response to rather specific contingent influences. 
Rahman has reminded us earlier of how such influences served to compromise the 
Qur'anic ethical imperative. 











[t]he predominant moral motif of the [Qur'an] is undoubtedly the stipulation that the human 
agent oUght to place himself in an appropriate relationship to God or His commandments if 
he is to satisfy the conditions of uprightness (birr) or piety (taqwa) or to earn his rightful 
position in Paradise. However interpreted, this stipulation is grounded in the concept of 
religious obligation (takUf) and its inevitable prerequisite, obedience (JiFah). The violation of 
this precept results, of course, in the nullification of the right relationship between God, as 
Lawgiver and Lord, and man, as creature or servant, designated by the [Qur>lin] as 
disobedience (al-m'afiyah) or sin.30 
The Qur'anic ethical imperative can therefore be best understood in terms of an intimate, 
unbreakable bond between Creator and created - whether acknowledged or not -
involving certain human obligations, the fulfillment of which results in eternal felicity 
and bliss and failure eternal damnation. 
The Qur'anic ethos pivots around three fundamental poles outlined and stipulated by 
means of revelation. These are, a) the nature of right and wrong, b) divine justice and 
power, and c) moral freedom and responsibility.3) Fakhry goes into some detail outlining 
the relevant Qur'anic verses that deal with these themes. In brief, the Qur'an advocates 
that it is the prerogative of God to determine right and wrong, this being in keeping with 
His attributes of being All-Knowing and All-Powerful. Human beings have however been 
granted the freedom to adhere to God's commands or to transgress, but are reminded by 
the Qur'an that they are ultimately fully accountable for such irresponsibility. 
Transgression is recompensed by eternal damnation and obedience by eternal bliss, this 











The various ethical theories that were formulated at later stages can be differentiated and 
characterised in terms of the positions they advocate vis-a.-vis the three fundamental 
poles. Their conformance to the Qur'anic ethos is measurable to the extent in which they 
comply to the exclusive Qur'anic position outlined above. At this juncture it is extremely 
important to stress once again that although we are able to distill unequivocal moral 
positions from the Qur'an, a well-articulated moral theory is found wanting. Rather, the 
Qur'an instills within the interlocutor a clearly identifiable moral psychology that 
obviates the spelling out of a theory of right and wrong. Moral agency is as such 
expressed through action, this being the first indication of the ontological status of values 
in Islam. The way in which the moral mind set is constructed and hence the ethical 
positions of the Qur'an affirmed will be discussed in the final section on the Qur'anic 
dialogic and the construction of the ideal-self. However, attention must now be turned to 
outlining the (negative) effects of speCUlative metaphysics in some detail because once its 
heretical wing had taken flight there was no way in which it could be pinioned. The only 
other recourse is to re-affirm the authentic ethical spirit of the Qur'an, which becomes a 
quest after moral truth and a perennial exercise in recovery. 
From the outline above it is quite apparent that the Qur'an accords ethical values an 
ontological status. It is the prerogative of God to determine what is right and wrong and 
these directives are conveyed by means of obligations, prohibitions and general 
exhortations concerning human behavior detailed in the Qur'an. I have argued at some 
length in the previous chapter that ontology - or a certain mode of being-in-the world - is 











Qur'anic orientation which locates virtue (birr) in acts of obedience (rlFah) that conform 
to the Divine Will. But this is not the only level at which the Qur'an espouses a strictly 
ontological moral ethic. The very nature of the directives outlined in the Qur'an are 
construed by Muslims as an expression of the Divine Will and are therefore accorded an 
ontological status. While these directives are easily comprehendible by the rational 
faculties, they are in no way determined by them. In other words, the Qur'anic directives 
have an essential status, not a derivative one. i The Qur'anic directives are held to be 
transcendental, ahistorical and immutable and it is tempting to regard them as 'things~in­
themselves' known through revelation. While a knowable 'thing~in~itself is clearly 
contradictory in Kantian terms, the description is extremely compelling when applied to 
the Divine Will embodied in the Qur'an, and thus quite apt. 
By denying the possibility of knowing a thing-in-itself Kant affirmed an ontology that 
cannot transcend the senses and he therefore introduced a moral vision founded on his 
idea of the categorical imperative. Such a paradigm obviously rejects revelation as a 
source of morals as it is founded on an ontology that denies the possibility of knowing 
things in their essences. Kant as such affirmed a mediated conception of reality, which 
naturally insisted that all moral value be determined by reason. This position has certain 
parallels with the thought of the Mu'tazilah, who are regarded as the first genuine 
moralists of Islam. As Fakhry explains, these theologians were concerned with 
establishing "that the nature of right and wrong can be determined rationally and that it is 
ultimately independent of the divine prescriptions as laid down in the [Qur'an]; in short 











they wished to establish that the two moral categories of right and wrong can be known 
by unaided reason and the ground of their validity can be justified".32 
The MuCtazilah theologians deontologised the status of right and wrong by predicating it 
on actions that are known through intuition, a rational faculty no doubt. They thus 
assigned morality an epistemic status. Not only does this logic compromise the credibility 
of revelation, it also opens the door to moral relativism. Fakhry justly points out that none 
of the MuCtazilah scholars made so bold as to declare revelation entirely superfluous, but 
they certainly did open the door for some of the naturalist philosophers of the ninth and 
tenth centuries, such as Abu Bakr al-Razi.33 
A few modem scholars like Muhammad Abu Zahrah are sympathetic to the 
circumstances under which the MuCtazilah formulated their theories. Abu Zahrah 
contends that they were compelled to take recourse to rational argumentation since they 
engaged in debate with opponents that did not subscribe to the Islamic tenets of faith. 34 
While this may be entirely true, it does not undo the damage inflicted upon the ethical 
imperative of the Qur'an. What is equally lamentable is that their disputations directed 
Islamic thought upon a trajectory that made it difficult to return to the pristine Islam of 
the primary sources. The ethical rationalism of the MuCtazilah gave rise in tum to the 
voluntaristic ethics of the' AshCarite doctors. 











The quasi-deontological theory of right and wrong of the Mu'tazilite theologians was a 
response to an earlier deterministic position that held God to be the real author of every 
action or occurrence in the world, so that voluntary actions are imputed to humans purely 
metaphorically.35 In similar vein, the 'Ash'arite school represents an intricate and 
extremely well sustained rejoinder to the ethical philosophy adumbrated by the 
Mu'tazilah, but in the process revived and affirmed some of the earlier deterministic 
positions refuted by the MU'tazilah. In this way the Qur'anic ethical imperative was 
continually circumvented by the unending infighting and hostilities swaying back and 
forth between the various sects. 
The) Ashcarites rejected the Mu'tazilah claim that goodness and badness (being essential 
characteristics of the action) can be rationally known "on the grounds that the 
presumption of intuitive certainty in the apprehension of good and evil is contradicted by 
the disagreement of vast numbers of people on the allegedly certain maxims of 
morality".36 Although the 'Ashcarites presented a strong refutation of the purely 
rationalistic ethics of the MuCtazilah and attempted to place ethics in the realm of the 
divine commandments and prohibitions of the Qur'an, they were unable to escape the 
voluntaristic tendencies they inherited from the early determinists.37 
They therefore ran afoul of the Qur'anic position on moral freedom and responsibility by 
insisting that "the human agent is by himself entirely incapable of carrying out any of his 
own designs, for he lacks the properties of self-sufficiency and independence, which are 











which is incidentally the bedrock of accountability in the Qur'anic world view - Ibn I:Iazm 
also accuses them of advocating the Murjf>ah position of withholding moral judgement 
alluded to earlier.39 
The impact of the' Ashcarite school was tremendous and it stood as the dominant voice of 
Islamic orthodoxy for centuries. The only other critical alternative worth mentioning was 
that of the Salafi School, with Ibn Taymiyyah as its most eloquent spokesperson. Be that 
as it may, not even he was immune from the doctrinal accretions he so severely criticised. 
Abu Zahrah astutely notes that Ibn Taymiyyah could not avoid affirming an 
anthropomorphic image of the divine that was obviously contradictory to the Qur'anic 
conception of an absolutely unique God.40 The impact of anthropomorphism was alluded 
to in the last chapter, where it was argued that ontological proximity between the divine 
and the human is what ultimately led to deification of the self The deified self obviously 
does not take recourse to revelation to derive its ethics. 
As such, the desire to return to a systematic complex of ethical values based on the moral 
precepts of the Qur'an was to remain unfulfilled. This very same desire still occupies the 
concerns of contemporary scholars like the late Fazlur Rahman, and it is therefore 
important to ask whether such ontological commitment to the status of values as 
expressed in the Qur'an is justifiable in terms of contemporary philosophical discourse. It 











It is essential at this juncture to express the Qur'anic position elaborated upon above in 
the language of contemporary phiJosophicaJ discourse. I have thus far argued that the 
Qur'an regards moral properties as a non-natural species sui generis, so that good and bad 
- or right and wrong - are categories that are ontological. Unlike the Kantian reliance 
upon intuition or reason, the only correct way to apprehend these ethical values is 
through the aid of revelation, more specifically, through Qur'anic directives that obligate 
certain actions and prohibit others, be it explicitly stated or even quite possibly strongly 
implied. This position is hardly given consideration in contemporary metaethics and, as 
such, must be sufficiently defended. However, before proceeding further, a brief 
overview of current trends and developments in the field of metaethics is necessary to 
place things in proper perspective. 
The more or less standard methodology in mainstream metaethics today involves the 
theorist trying to accommodate and explain the common sense elements and 
characteristics of ordinary moral talk and thought within the scope of larger 
(meta)physical commitments.41 These commitments can generally be traced back to post-
Kantian influences that finally culminated in two major traditions. The idealist tradition 
evolved directly out of Kant's philosophy and sought to carry his insights further, while 
the empiricist tradition denied Kantian epistemology and sought to establish different 
insights altogether.42 Current trends stem from these two major traditions, either 











The idealist tradition developed a non-naturalistic theory of valuation, where it has 
become possible "to speak critically of an aprioristic realm of being, namely the realm of 
values".43 In other words, it "claims ideal self-existence sui generis for values".44 Ethics, 
from this perspective, still falls within the scope of metaphysics. While this position is 
remarkably similar to the Qur'anic one in that moral categories are regarded as being 
ontological, it differs fundamentally from it by claiming that valuation can be 
apprehended intuitively. Drawing on the work of Nikolai Hartmann, al-Fariiqi narrows in 
on the fundamental weakness of this position, pointing out that in this ethical theory 
the realm of values is one where individual members operate under the law of the bel/um 
omnium contra omnes; for every individual member is constantly trying to monopolize the 
field of human vision and rule tyrannically to the exclusion of its brother-members without 
any chance of reconciliation whatever. The idealist tradition. therefore, which claims ideal 
self-existence sui generis for values, does so for them as an indefinite internally chaotic 
mass.45 
This shortcoming glaringly contradicts the idealist claim that (moral) consensus can be 
reached a priori. A1-Fariiqi's criticism is in this sense similar to the )Ashcarite critique 
(mentioned earlier) of the MuCtazilite assertion that right and wrong can be grasped 
through reason. Both censures indicate that any a priori moral vision remains practically 
untenable. Because of this fundamental flaw, the idealist ethical outlook is unable to 
transcend de facto moral relativism, as there are potentially as many conceptions of the 
good as there are rational subjects. Added to this is the tremendous burden of history that 











The empiricist tradition, on the other hand, ruled out the a priori nature of the moral law 
altogether. The factual character of right and wrong was thus sought either in the psychic 
faculties of man or in the empirical qualities of things.46 From this perspective, ethics 
does not necessarily fall into the realm of metaphysics. Although the empiricist camp 
encompasses a wide variety of theories (Evolutionary, Marxist, Pragmatist, Humanist, 
etc.) rich in explanatory detail, 
dependence upon a state of the subject remains in all these theories the essential 
characteristic of value throughout That this state is an approbative state, or a state of 
agreement and harmony, demands in ftrst place that the locus of goodness be within the 
subject alone.41 
Because valuation represents one type of empirical cognition and like all empirical truth 
it cannot be known except through the senses, this theory is best depicted as naturalistic. 48 
As such, the obvious conclusion reached by the empiricists was that moral predicates are 
mere expressions of emotions and thus removed outside the realms of truth and 
falsehood. Consequently, there can be "no way in which a conscious, deliberate and 
consistently-held difference in what ought or ought not to be, can be solved or even 
composed" . 49 
The first major problem one therefore faces in the empiricist tradition is its implicit 
resignation to a moral-relativist position. It must however be acknowledged that thinkers 
in this tradition sit far more comfortably in this posture than their idealist counterparts 











concede to a morality based on communal consensus or an ethics without principles. 50 
Other naturalist thinkers may explicitly deny moral relativism, but they do not do so very 
convincingly. SI The only way to concede that moral judgement is categorical is to think 
of moral properties as non-natural and ontological, which implies accepting that 'good', 
is in some way definable. 
This leads directly to the second major problem within the empiricist tradition, which is 
the denial that 'good' is in anyway definable. s2 The philosopher's task is in a sense 
reduced to that of semantically analyzing what the subject means to say when he reports 
his findings of value-quality. 53 As Dreier points out, the only metaphysical option in the 
face of a definitional dead end would be to accept that moral properties are, amongst 
other things, a non-natural species sui generis and ontologically brute, even if this 
position is somewhat old fashioned. S4 While this position may not necessarily be in vogue 
today, it at least does not suffer from incoherence or blatant self-contradiction. 
This position is far closer to the Qur'anic view outlined earlier and it concurs with the 
major premises expressed by the idealists as welL Consequently, attention must now be 
turned to exploring the Qur)anic position in light of the factors just discussed. This is 
important because the Qur)anic position has not been explicitly articulated and justified in 
the language of contemporary metaethics, even if it has been alluded to by the likes of 
Rahman. A further consideration is that certain elements in contemporary Islamic 
discourse reflect trends very similar to those in the idealist and empiricist tradition. For 











constructs, but are products of history. 55 For him rights are embodied in practices and 
constituted in our linguistic consciousness, something alluded to in the sources of Islamic 
law and ethics, i.e. the Qur'an and prophetic traditions. He therefore calls for recognition 
of the historical and linguistic elements of the canonical texts. Although he remains 
vague about the metaphysical nature of ethics, his historicist sentiments clearly place him 
in closer proximity to the empiricist tradition that denies the metaphysical status of ethics 
and views moral categories in naturalist terms. This contradicts the non-naturalist, 
ontological character of the moral values expressed in the Qur'an. Moosa is acutely aware 
of the implications of his position since he regards any assertion of the idea ofa founding 
or originary text as a statement of "text fundamentalism". 56 
His corrective is to abandon the idea of the foundational text, which can only result in the 
complete erasure of the Qur)anic ethical imperative. His despondency is borne out of the 
realisation that "a canonical text is flexible to our desires and goals".57 While this is 
indeed true, he gives no consideration to the believing subject who is just as flexible, able 
to temper his or her desires in accordance with the moral dictates of the Qur)an. It has to 
be stressed that the power of the agent to reject is not enough to invalidate the 
foundational text. Moosa's position leans heavily in favor of the empiricist tradition - and 
all that it implies - but does not at the same time reflect a deep understanding of the 
significance of the Qur'an as foundational text. It is therefore necessary to articulate the 
idea of a Qur)anic ethical imperative as lucidly as possible, so as to facilitate engagement 
with outside alternatives as well as the plurality of understandings expressed within the 











whether it can be reasonably argued that moral categories are ontological, and whether 
revelation is justifiably a source for these sui generis categories of right and wrong. Both 
concerns can be addressed by understanding the nature and construction of social reality. 
What then, is the ontology of the social? In order to address this question effectively we 
must once again revisit the crucial shift in the function of metaphysics discussed in the 
last chapter and briefly alluded to in the opening of this section. I have thus far 
maintained that even though the current emphasis in metaphysics presses upon the 
essential structure of our thought, its primary function remains necessarily ontological 
because it is still concerned with issues of being and existence. Even though we give up 
the idea of the 'separate reality' as a possible field of inquiry - as Kant suggests - we are 
still able to maintain our transcendental concerns simply because they are social 
constructs. 
The nature of social reality is such that ontologically subjective constructs can indeed 
enjoy an epistemically objective status. In other words, transcendental entities like God 
and a divinely inspired moral code can be justified as ontological categories even though 
we are unable to experience these entities through our senses. To explain these claims in 
sufficient detail, we must turn to the work of John Searle, one of the most prominent 
thinkers in contemporary analytical and language philosophy. 
Searle's most recent work is concerned with the realities of our world that we do not 
confront through our senses, but still compel us to conduct our affairs in a certain way. S8 











able to function causally because we are convinced of the veracity of these beliefs. 59 The 
existence of God, for example, is not exclusively dependent upon a set of beliefs (even if 
essentially constitutive of the phenomenon called God) because there has to be broad-
based acceptance of these beliefs as well. These beliefs may also in tum be governed by 
certain constitutive rules. It therefore becomes apparent that there is a complex ontology 
underlying all of social reality. What, then, is the ontology of the social and the 
institutional? And how can there be "an objective reality that is what it is only because 
we think it is what it is?". 60 
Searle argues that much of our world view depends on our concept of objectivity and the 
contrast between objective and subjective.61 For our purposes, it is crucial to stress" an 
epistemic sense of the objective-subjective distinction and an ontological sense". 62 In the 
epistemic sense, Searle explains, "objective" and "subjective" are primarily predicates of 
judgement. We would thus objectively judge something true or false if it corresponded to 
a hard fact, but would only be able to express a subjective preference when comparing 
two works of art, for example. However, in the related ontological sense "objective" and 
"subjective" are predicates of entities and types of entities, and they ascribe modes of 
existence.63 Revelation, in the ontological sense, is subjective because its mode of 
existence depends on being felt by a subject, a person we usually refer to as a prophet. A 
mountain, by contrast, is ontologically objective because its existence is independent of 
any perceiverii or mental state. The relevance of differentiating between epistemic and 
ontological objectivity is to stress the distinction "between those features that we might 
ii It is clear from this statement that Searle advocates a commonsense notion of philosophical realism, 










call intrinsic to nature and those features that exist relative to the intentionality of 
observers, users, etc." .64 Our main problem is thus "to explain how there can be an 
epistemically objective social reality that is partly constituted by an ontologically 
subjective set of attitudes". 65 Searle explains that all of social and institutional reality can 
be explained by elaborating on three notions, i.e., the assignment of function, collective 
intentionality, and constitutive rules.66 
Beginning with the first, we need to note that the capacity of conscious agents to create 
social facts is dependent on the imposition or the assignment of functions to objects and 
to other phenomena.67 These functions are never intrinsic; they are part of a system 
"where the system is in part defined by purposes, goals, and values generally".68 We may 
thus think of humans as part of a larger scheme brought into existence by God, where our 
ultimate purpose is to comply to the Divine Will embodied in the revelations made to the 
prophets, the last of whom is Muhammad, recipient of the QUI)an, which serves as a 
guide for humankind by explicating on right and wrong, or good and bad. It is of central 
importance to understand that the functional attribution introduces normativity: 
The nonnativity is a consequence of the fact that the functional attribution situates the causal 
facts within a teleology. The attribution of function presupposes the notion of purpose, or a 
goal, or an objective, and thus the attribution ascribes more than just causal relations. These 
purposes, goals, and objectives exist only relative to human and animal agents [ ... ]. We can 











Speaking specifically about ethics, Jonathan Jacobs stresses the importance of 
acknowledging teleological considerations more explicitly.70 He laments how the 
teleological element of virtue has been largely replaced by the agent's cognitive 
engagement with the world. "The philosophical environment is not supportive of notions 
of an intrinsic end for human nature, or a unified, harmonious conception of human good. 
For reasons coming from metaphysics and concerning the pluralism and 
incommensurability of values, it can look like teleology in ethics has been starved out".71 
Jacobs is however adamant that there can be no plausible, adequate notion of virtue free 
of teleological considerations.72 This is because humans will always attribute certain 
functions to their causal relations, as Searle has indicated. For example, Muslims believe 
that the Qur'an embodies fixed moral categories of right and wrong, compliance to which 
is rewarded by God. They as such conduct their affairs in accordance with this 
attribution. This leads us directly to Searle's second notion, i.e., collective intentionality. 
To put it as basically as possible, whenever you have people sharing their thoughts and 
feelings or cooperating you have collective intentionality. Searle defines a social fact as 
any fact involving two or more agents who have collective intentionality.73 He further 
explains that while social facts may involve physical cooperation, institutional facts 
extend way beyond, creating social realities that are founded upon complex webs of 
belief. The centrality of the Qur'an in Muslim practice - viewed from this perspective -
can thus be understood as an affirmation of the function it has been assigned because it is 











The nature of the Qur>an is such that it not only regulates Muslim behavior, but it in 
many ways also constitutes, or makes possible, the form of behavior it regulates. This is 
Searle's third and final element that makes sense of social reality. Institutional facts, he 
argues, can only be fully explained in terms of constitutive rules, because they are only 
able to exist within systems of such rules.74 It is therefore crucial at this point to mention 
the role of language in institutional reality. Searle's ideas on language are informed by 
the seminal work of his teacher, J. L. Austin.7s He argues that in institutional reality, 
language is not used merely to describe the facts but is partly constitutive of the facts. 76 
Performative utterances, Searle explains, are those in which saying something makes it 
true. This applies to all of the ethical and legal injunctions in the Qur>an, or in any legal 
or ethical code for that matter. The role of performative utterances is of greater relevance 
to our final section and will thus be detailed later. Turning to immediate concerns 
however, this brief elaboration on the nature and construction of social reality should 
sufficiently enable us to make sense of the ontological nature of moral categories and 
justify the claim that the source of these moral values are the revelations that constitute 
the Qur'an. 
All of social reality is constructed in the manner just described and it must therefore be 
acknowledged that there are always alternatives to any given moral system. Such 
alternatives are constructed by the assignment of functions that project a very different 
teleology, affirmed by a given social collective, and governed by its own set of 
constitutive rules. It is well worth considering the thought of Freidrich Nietzsche as a 











day prophet of materialism because he proposed a teleology that expressed ultimate 
meaning for human beings in self-referential terms. He displaced God as ultimate 
authority by pronouncing Him dead and filling the vacuum with his Superman, thereby 
preaching a new atheistic creed that would lead humanity to greatness. 77 In terms of 
ethics, he consequently rid us of the 'tedious' categories of "good" and "bad" and put in 
its place "the will to power," which he viewed as an essentially human drive that steers 
towards self-fulfillment78 
How does one then claim preference for one system of ethical beliefs over another, when 
both are essentially social constructs? The only adequate response other than claiming 
superiority for one's own beliefs would be to concede that the final arbiter in such cases 
is always history. The apologist can only strive to understand, interrogate and articulate 
his or her own beliefs as cogently as possible, thereby extending open invitation to 
anyone predisposed to responding. Searle has reminded us that the assignment of any 
function only makes sense in the context of a presupposed teleology. If the purposes, 
goals or objectives implicit in any system of ethics are no longer venerated, it loses its 
causal power and is reduced from a Jiving reality to an empty discourse of words. The 
earlier chapters discussed the disillusionment with modernity and postmodernity and the 
ensuing critiques of these social and philosophical projects. From the perspective just 












I have also pointed out that the displacement of the Qur'an as foundational text was due 
to deviation from its expressed teleology, resulting in the dislocation of the Qur'anic 
ethical imperative from the ultimate concerns of the Muslim community. This dislocation 
translated as loss of meaning. Consequently, to speak about the re-emergence of the 
foundational text in contemporary Islamic discourse - in relation to the dominant global 
secular paradigm - is to recognise the reassertion of an alternate authentic ideal whose 
proposed teleology once again holds much promise. The source of values and the 
ultimate meaning of our existential struggles are once again being sought in the Qur'an, 
now that fascination with Enlightenment Reason has been resolutely displaced by 
sobering disgruntlement. We must thus tum attention to understanding the Qur'an in 
relation to the boundaries it has foreordained. The recognition of defining boundaries is 
absolutely essential because - as has been argued earlier - the identity of the believer as a 
moral subject is constructed within this framework of ultimate concerns. Therefore, the 
issue of permanent, fixed, or ahistorical aspects of Islamic discourse in relation to the 
changing, in-flux, or historical aspects must now be addressed. 
4. Permanence and Change 
Social evolution has always been effected by problematising the cultural norms specific 
to any given community. The influences that bring these norms into question and thereby 
stimulate change may arise from deep introspection within the community, or from 
outside voices expressing an alternative that finds a place within. This process has led to 
the complete obliteration of entire civilisations, as has been argued by Arnold Toynbee in 











because its normative aspects are still very meaningful to Muslims. This does not in any 
way suggest that these norms have not been brought into question or challenged. 
Moosa penetratingly observes that contemporary Muslim thought is suspended between 
two narratives: the narrative of origins, where memory of a glorious past is powerfully 
invoked as evidence of the historical truth of this faith-movement, and the narrative of an 
unfulfilled present wavering in the flux of hi story. 80 Whereas he chooses to employ the 
continuous momentum of change to challenge the apparent stability of the narrative of 
origins, traditional Muslim apologists have taken the opposite extreme by advocating the 
fixity and eternal validity of the entire classical tradition. 81 Both views do grave injustice 
to the authentic Islamic ideal. To deny the foundational text on the basis of changing 
social realities is to unjustifiably trivialise its relevance and to implicitly suggest the 
obliteration of a very vibrant and meaningful tradition. In contrast, to affirm the eternal 
validity of the entire classical tradition is equally denigrating because it entraps the 
Islamic ideal in a discourse of vulgar literalism. 
Noel Coulson expresses an explicit understanding of the importance of oscillating 
between eternally valid standards and the needs of society. Writing about Islamic law, 
which in an ideal sense would be the embodiment of the Qur'anic ethical imperative he 
argues that: 
The needs and aspirations of society cannot be, in Islam, the exclusive detenninant of the 











irrevocably established by the divine command. And it is precisely the detennination of these 
limits which is the unfinished task of legal modemism.82 
Apart from recognising the need for boundaries, Coulson also alludes to the importance 
of determining precisely what these permanent or fixed poles are. Postmodernist 
discourse has shown a particular distaste for defining boundaries and therefore expresses 
an acceptance of continuous change and revulsion for permanence and immutability. 
However, in order for Islam to persist as an authentic ideal it has to maintain its core 
characteristics and still reflect sensitivity to change. In what follows, I will firstly affirm 
the permanent axis of Islamic discourse, before going on to outline how the relationship 
between revelation and reason in the Islamic tradition is able to accommodate the 
immutable aspects of Islamic discourse in light of ever-changing realities. This will be 
further elaborated upon by briefly outlining a hermeneutical model that centres on 
establishing social practices that are informed by divine intent. My discussion in this 
section is intentionally brief, as I am solely concerned with indicating the ability of 
Islamic discourse to negotiate changing realities while still claiming permanence and 
immutability. 
I have argued earlier that the Qur'anic ethical system is founded on ontologically rigid 
moral categories, but it must now be explicitly stated that it is precisely these ethical 
norms that represent the permanent axis that acts as the benchmark of authentic Islam in 
light of ever-changing social realities. This does not imply a literal application of 
revelation insensitive to contextual or cultural factors nor does it valorise the classical 











evolution of Islamic law by suspending ijtihiid (independent reasoning) is to confer on 
the founders of the schools of law the status of "disembodied" subjects who have asked 
and answered all questions for all times. 83 He is as such weary of the transcendental 
subject, immune from history and argues for an "embodied" subject who is influenced, 
affected and conditioned by history. Citing the Muslim historiographer Ibn Khaldo.n, he 
emphasises the importance of reading scripture in the light of concrete history. 
However, he is just as explicit in asserting that any argument that discountenances God 
as the foundation of knowledge and ethics cannot remain within the ambit of Islamic 
discourse.84 In other words, the existence of God as the Transcendental Source of being, 
knowledge and ethics - as is expressed in the Qur'an - constitutes the defining boundary 
of the foundational text and is not subject to change. Located within this boundary is the 
human subject challenged by a world in constant motion. The only vehicle, then, able to 
traverse the divide between the two poles of permanence and change is ijtihiid 
(independent reasoning). This necessarily brings into question the nature of the 
relationship between reason and revelation in the Islamic tradition. Khan insightfully 
explains this relationship by arguing that 
In Islam, the principle of ljtihiid is the vehicle that employs 'human reason' and 'independent 
jUdgement' in order to contextualize the significance of revelation. Through a fusion of 
reason and revelation 'truth' is made temporally relevant. Thus the ahistorical and 
acontextual truth - The Truth - which is contained in the Qur:lful, is accessed via reason to 











He further argues that the above understanding of the nature of revelation and its relation 
to reason is the foundational principle of contemporary Islamic discourse. We must as 
such explore this relationship in some detail, starting by locating it within the broader 
context of contemporary philosophical discourse. 
The concepts of revelation and reason as understood in Islam currently lies partly 
concealed under the debris created by the tremendous legacies of modernity and 
postmodernity. The central aim of both revelation and reason has always been the 
aspiration to truth and knowledge, which are two terms very often expressed 
synonymously as meaning. Kant, for example, discounted revelation as a source of 
knowledge and argued in favor of reason, in the process strengthening the hand of 
modernist discourse. Postmodern discourse not only unseated reason but brought into 
question the very concept of meaning altogether. 
Although modernist discourse finally came to view reason and revelation in mutually 
exclusive terms, we find that in the Islamic tradition they are intimately linked. While 
divinely revealed truth defines the existential objectives of humankind, the role of reason 
is primarily to digest the message of the Qur'an through intellectual striving and practical 
implementation. Drawing on the projected teleology ofthe Qur'an (Abd ai-Majid ai-Najar 
explains that revelation addresses both the existential objectives of humankind as well as 
the means to fulfill these objectives so that the responsibility of understanding and 
implementation is entrusted to the faculty of reason. 86 He further adds that the fulfillment 











punishable. The final destiny of humankind - from an Islamic perspective - is therefore 
determined by the successful reconciliation between reason and revelation. 
To be expressly clear then, the role of reason is to make sense of revelation so that human 
beings may fulfill the existential objectives expressed therein. AI-Najar explains that this 
role necessarily involves two very distinct phases, that of understanding and that of 
application to any given situation. 87 Stated differently, this role may be seen to extend to 
theoretical concerns firstly and then to practical considerations. The main function of 
reason in the first phase of interaction with revelation is to determine "Divine Intent," 
which then in turn informs human praxis. 88 This leads directly to the second phase, where 
reason is applied in assessing situational contexts so as to. best judge the circumstances 
and conditions for putting into effect the injunctions derived from revelation. I will return 
to the practical aspects later but must now elaborate more upon the role of reason in 
determining the objectives spelt out by God the Lawgiver, what ai-Najar describes as 
"Divine Intent." 
As mentioned earlier, the very concept of meaning has been problematised in 
contemporary philosophical discourse. From this perspective the claim that divine intent 
can be established from the Qur'an would certainly be problematic. Literary theorists who 
reduce the Qur'an to an immanent text could ostensibly argue that the interlocutor can 
never really know authorial intent, therefore 'God' could be understood to be saying just 
about anything. Philosophers like Hans-Georg Gadamer have questioned the meaning of 











further argued that even if critics could obtain access to an author's intention this would 
not necessarily ground the literary text in determinate meaning, because an author's 
intention is itself a complex 'text' which can be debated, translated and interpreted in 
many ways.90 If the Qur)an were to be approached from this perspective then it could 
never serve as a stable centre of meaning and would hence lose all significance. 
The Qur'anic theory of meaning is closer to that of the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl. His theory of meaning is pre-linguistic, i.e., it suggests that meaning is 
something which the author wills.9l In Qur'anic terms, then, meaning or truth IS 
equivalent to that which is expressed by God and what we have called divine intent. The 
fundamental question that thus arises in this regard is how do we then determine the 
"Divine Intent" (ai-Murad al-'Ilahi) or, synonymously, the "objectives of the Lawgiver" 
(Maqa#d al-Shari,).92 This is an issue that has been elaborated upon in immense detail in 
the Islamic tradition and finds its most eloquent and cogent expression in the work of the 
Andalusian scholar Abu Isl}aq al-Shafibi.93 His work has impacted upon contemporary 
Islamic discourse very profoundly and is currently enjoying a very spirited revival. More 
importantly, his discourse represents a critical alternative to the relativistic theories of 
meaning just alluded to and although firmly grounded in the traditional Islamic sciences, 
al-Shatibi's ideas are very relevant to contemporary philosophical trends. 
A1-Shatibi's hermeneutical model for determining divine intent from the Qur)an relies 
upon five fundamental components, which we will briefly discuss in order of 











which some of the ensuing components also rely - and therefore deserves considerable 
attention. Since the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, it must be understood in accordance 
with the specificities of this language. For al-Sha{ibi, "the Arabic tongue is the Translator 
of God's intentions".9s Drawing no doubt on the legacy of his predecessors, he advocates 
a theory of meaning that is anchored to a particular usage, circumstance, and historical 
and religious situation, which is pretty much the position of the Andalusian Zahirites.96 
Ibn l:lazm, the greatest of the Zahirite scholars, in fact directly influenced much of al-
Sha~ibi's thought.97 The name Zahirite derives from the Arabic word for clear, apparent 
and phenomenal, accurately reflecting the theory of meaning developed by them.98 
Edward Said asserts that much of their polemics anticipate twentieth-century debates 
between structuralists and generative grammarians and between descriptivists and 
behaviorists, as these Andalusian linguists directed their energies against tendencies to 
turn the question of meaning in language into esoteric and allegorical exercises. Said 
further expresses dismay with the undue emphasis placed in recent critical theory on the 
limitlessness of interpretation. Inspired by the medieval Arabic linguists, he calls for the 
constraining of interpretation. He therefore endorses the Zahirite notion of meaning 
because 
it represents a considerably articulated thesis for dealing with a text as significant fonn, in 
which [ ... ] worldliness, circumstantiality, the text's status as an event having sensuous 
particularity as well as historica1 contingency, are considered as being incorporated in the 
text, an infrangible part of its capacity for conveying and producing meaning. TILis means 
that a text has a specific situation, placing restraints upon the interpreter and his interpretation 











situation exists at the same level of surface particularity as the textual object itself. There are 
many ways for conveying such a situation, but what I want to draw particular attention to 
here is an ambition (which the Zahirites have to an intense degree) on the part of readers and 
writers to grasp texts as objects whose interpretation - by virtue of the exactness of their 
situation in the world - has already commenced and are objects already constrained by, and 
constraining, their interpretation. Such texts can thereafter be construed as having need at 
most of complementary, as opposed to supplementary, readings.99 
In the quest for meaning this view of language accommodates both permanence and 
change because it possesses two seemingly antithetical characteristics: "that of divinely 
ordained institution, unchanging, immutable, logical, rational, intelligible; and that of an 
instrument existing as pure contingency, as an institution signifying meanings anchored 
in specific utterances". 100 It is thus not contradictory to assert that the Qur'an is able to 
encompass and express a fixed moral ethic which is relevant to ever-changing contexts. 
The second component in al-Sha~ibi's hermeneutic relies on the commands and 
prohibitions expressed in the Qur'an, viewing these as unambiguous expressions of 
divine intent. lOI It is in this regard important to consider the differentiation between two 
very specific textual categories within the Qur'an made by Muslim scholars. The first 
category encompasses all statements that are of categorical intent (Qafiyah al-Diliilah), 
like those that convey commands and prohibitions. Such texts may be regarded as 
determinate structures because they are unambiguous and express a very specific 
meaning. Divine intent is clearly expressed in such texts and comprehension requires 











speculative intent (',?,anniyah al-DilaJah) and is usually open to more than one 
interpretation or understanding. Such texts may be regarded as indeterminate structures 
and considerable mental activity has to be expended to determine divine intent within the 
broader framework of the Qur)an in general, paying special attention to linguistic 
considerations and the explicit objectives derived from statements of categorical intent. l03 
The third component arises out of the second and concerns the fundamental objectives 
(al-Maqa#d al-;'A~liyah) expressed in the Qur)an as well as contingent objectives (al-
Maqa~id al-Tabtfiyah) necessitated by the fundamentals and making them possible. AI-
Sha~ibi regards revelation as a guide to that which is in our best interests in this world. He 
therefore explains that the Qur)an emphasises the protection of five fundamentals, these 
being religion, life, progeny, wealth and the intellect, and that the very purpose of 
revelation is to establish and safeguard these rights. 104 These fundamental rights represent 
the very ethos of the Qur)an and are continuously alluded to in various verses, being 
derived from the determinate textual structures mentioned above, which serve to act as a 
framework that restricts free interpretation and prevents any tailspin into what 
deconstructionists call infinite play. In terms of his hermeneutic model, an understanding 
of the fundamental objectives of the Lawgiver is essential when trying to establish divine 
intent from verses that are of speculative intent. 
AI-Najar admits that establishing divine intent is not always easy and the extent to which 
dependence is placed upon reason is determined by the nature of the verses being dealt 











Islamic spirit is oriented towards praxis and therefore such difficulty should not act as a 
deterrent to fulfilling one's moral obligations, this being the very purpose of existence. 
The fourth component in al-Shatibi's hermeneutic model is not only interesting but 
extremely innovative as well and concerns the silence of the Lawgiver (Sukilt aI-Shad). 
He basically argues that if revelation is silent on a matter without there being any 
justifiable reason for not addressing it, than this is indicative of divine intent and to 
provide religious legitimacy for the matter in question is an innovation. In other words, 
silence is an expression of disapproval because if the said matter was of importance then 
revelation would have addressed it. This component of his hermeneutic operates more in 
the sphere of injunctions pertaining to ritual obligations where innovated acts of worship 
are strictly frowned upon, as God has not enjoined them. 106 
The fifth and final component of al-Sha~ibi' s hermeneutic is induction. Although he does 
not specifically mention induction as part of his model, its importance cannot be ignored 
as it provides the basis for determining divine intent in all the cases where such intent is 
not clearly apparent. 107 
It should be apparent that al-Shapbi's hermeneutic model clearly oscillates between the 
poles of permanence and change so as to derive a model for human behavior that is true 
to divine intent. It is also a model where reason is clearly guided by revelation, but it 











determination of divine intent. The second phase of contact between revelation and 
reason strives to give practical expression to the directives distilled from the Qur'an. 
AI-Najar asserts that one of the major shortcomings in Islamic thought throughout its 
history has been to pay insufficient attention to the role of reason in determining the 
practical applicability of the directives distilled from the Qur>an. 108 He warns that to 
mechanically apply Qur)anic directives to any given reality without taking into 
consideration contextual nuances could result in the very subversion of divine intent. An 
important example in this regard is the suspension of the punishment for theft by (Umar, 
the third Caliph, in the year of famine. So while the Qur'an does indeed express 
categorical positions on certain matters, this in itself does not obviate sensitivity to 
context. It is not however being suggested that context is the sole determinant of the 
applicability ofQur)anic injunctions. The point is that from a practical perspective certain 
Qur)anic injunctions are flexible enough to accommodate contextual considerations while 
others are not and as such demand submission. 109 
The crux of what has been argued above is that revelation represents a fixed pole, which 
with the aid of reason, is able to imbue the ethical imperative of the Qur)an into the very 
fabric of society, in spite of ever changing social realities. More important than explicitly 
detailing what is eternal, what is open to change, or what lies in-between, is to recognise 
that the willingness to act upon the injunctions of the Qur'an can only arise out of an 











The Qur'an as foundational text addresses the ultimate concerns of the individual, and 
because society is no more than the individual multipHed, the Qur'an is only able to find 
expression in society if it resonates strongly in the individual. We must therefore shift 
attention back to the individual and elaborate upon how the intimate reception of the 
Qur'an influences the construction of the ideal-self 
5. The Qur'an and The Dialogical Self 
All the preceding sections in this chapter have been oriented towards demonstrating the 
centrality of the Qur'an in the Muslim psyche, or to put it in more familiar terms, to 
explain the re-emergence of the Qur'an as foundational text. It is therefore important to 
briefly revisit the main arguments that have been expressed thus far. I have earlier 
asserted that the reception of the Qur'an by the nascent Muslim community was such that 
it informed the very purpose of their existence, and is therefore best described as a 
foundational text. However, various factors contributed to the marginalisation of the 
Qur'an and it was in time no longer received as a foundational text, but more as scripture 
or a holy text. In spite of this mediated status, the Qur'an still exercised considerable 
authority over those who believed in it, regarding it as an expression of the Transcendent 
Will and as such in many aspects immutable, ahistorical, and acontextual. Muslim 
scholars consequently attempted to develop hermeneutic models that oscillated between a 
permanent axis and ever-changing social realities to enable living in accordance with 
divine intent. Nonetheless, it has also been shown that the centrality and authority of the 
Qur'an has continuously been challenged, but henceforth from a perspective that has dealt 











In order to appreciate the re-emergence of the Qur)an as foundational text we need to 
account for its authoritative nature by looking beyond the strictures that view it as a 
scriptural text. In what follows, I will therefore demonstrate that the Qur)an's ability to 
maintain its relevance and hence authority, is attributable to its communal and 
performative nature. I will proceed by firstly considering recent attempts to explain and 
understand the Qur'an and point out some of the shortcomings of these attempts. I will 
then present an alternative model that is able to make sense of the Qur'an as foundational 
text. 
The two most prevalent trends dealing with the study of the Qur'an today are no doubt 
the historical-philological approach and the literary approach. IIO While the first approach, 
pioneered by the likes of John Wansbrough, examines and problematises the historical 
conditions that gave rise to the Qur)an, the second approach has explicitly concerned 
itself with the relationship between the Qur'an and the generation of meaning. In the 
context of our inquiry, I will place more emphasis on the second approach because it 
relates far more directly to the reception of the Qur'an as a source of meaning. However, 
the insufficiency of both of these approaches must be noted from the outset. Daniel 
Madigan alerts us of the need to supplement these two approaches with one that is more 
sensitive to the study of religious phenomena because the Qur'an is more than merely an 
intriguingly problematic text. I II He warns that exclusive reliance upon these two 











Despite Madigan's cautjonary advice, many scholars remain extremely enamoured with 
especially the in vogue literary method. In a recent study on Qur)an literature Ebrahim 
Moosa challenges the very notion of stability of meaning, arguing that semiotic processes 
allow for the "continuous desymbolization and resymbolization of signs and symbols," 
thus keeping the generation of meaning in flux. 112 Drawing on the legacy of French post-
structuralist theorists like Derrida, Lacan and Foucault, Moosa attempts to demonstrate 
that "the search for meaning resides not so much in our knowledge of literary texts 
themselves, as in the way they are read and interpreted" .113 In this regard he affirms 
Foucault's jocose assertion that to know must therefore be to interpret. He consequently 
also agrees with Mohammed Arkoun that perhaps the revealed text is no more than "an 
infinite space for the mental projections of all the ideal types of perfect existence towards 
which believers aspire"Y4 In true postmodern form then, it seems that Moosa is able to 
do away with the text altogether, leaving us only with interpretation. 
Apart from the French post-structuralists, he also borrows from the eminent Russian 
literary theorist, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, in arguing against the stability or fixity 
of meaning. While Bakhtin clearly advocates the view that variant meanings are 
generated through a dialogic process, he in no way advocates a notion of the instability of 
meaning. Therefore, to construe 'dialogism' or 'heteroglossia' as opening the way to total 
linguistic freedom is certainly a misunderstanding. 1 IS For Bakhtin a core of stability 
makes verbal discourse as a system of signs altogether possible.1l6 It is around this fixed 
core that dialogic discourses are generated, giving rise to variant meanings. Moosa even 











when interpreting the Qur'an. However, his conclusion in this regard leaves cause for 
concern because in spite of Bakhtin's disclaimer concerning the necessity of a stable 
core, Moosa concludes that al-Tabari forcefully eliminates the dialogue of discourses into 
a monologue of stabilised meaning. ll7 In clear contradiction to what Bakhtin has 
contended, not only does he disparage the concept of a stable core, but he also suggests 
that to assert the core meaning is to eliminate the dialogic process. 
In similar vein, Michael Fischer and Mehdi Abedi also emphasise the limitlessness of 
interpretation by rhetorically asking whether the polysemic and nomadic meanings of a 
text such as the Qur'an are able to overcome " the unbewised efforts to reduce it to a 
monologic decree".1l8 They further question whether an "enigmatic text such as the 
Qur'an" is able to "function as a poetic touchstone for a universalistic ethics".1l9 
There are two major oversights perpetrated by Moosa, Fischer and Abedi. In the first 
instance, the claim that stability of meaning can justifiably be seen as an elimination of 
"the dialogue of discourses" and therefore as an imposition of a "mono logic decree" is 
not at all convincing, especially not as a consequence ofBakhtin's thought. I will address 
this issue in some detail later, but must now tum to the second problem, concerning the 
limitlessness of interpretation and the 'enigmatic' nature of the Qur'an. 











even leaving aside the reductionism of many Western scholars, one must also give full 
weight to the fact that through many centuries the Qur'iin has seemed univocal and coherent 
to a substantial community of people; that its meaning, far from being considered 'nomadic', 
has appeared clearly settled. It is, perhaps, of the nature of scripture that the believing reader 
seeks to settle on the meaning of the text. The fact that others have arrived at different 
meanings leads the believer to the conclusion not that meaning is nomadic but rather that 
believers are - sometimes so nomadic that they must be considered as having strayed beyond 
the bounds of the community offaithl20 
So while the postmodem theorist may deny that the very notions of 'meaning' and 
'coherence' have any content, the community of believers continue to engage the Qur'an 
as perfectly coherent. I21 Even though Madigan somewhat derisively attributes this to the 
way in which all scripture is conceived of in general, the fact is that Muslims are still 
inspired by the Qur'an in a way that is given expression to in everyday praxis. This only 
serves to emphasise that it is received in a manner that clearly suggests coherence, in 
addition to pointing out the severe shortcomings of the literary approach. 
A very recent approach developed by Abdulkader Tayob shows far greater sensitivity in 
dealing with the Qur'an than the literary approach just described and is worth briefly 
considering. The outstanding feature of Tayob's approach is that he pays considerable 
attention to the oral nature, reception, and repetition of the Qur'an. For Tayob, the 
Qur'an is "the symbol of the divine irruption into the world within Islam". 122 So being 
acutely aware of the tremendous significance of Qur'anic recitation on the occasion of the 











of the sermon itself. He concludes that "every recitation was also a re·citation when the 
d I f h Q -" k . " 123 H contexts an comp ex resources 0 t e ur'an m society were ta en mto account . e 
insightfully distinguishes recitation from re-citation, using the hyphenation to emphasise 
the spaces and the interference between different recitations. Re-citation thus combines 
both an interpretation and a performance. 124 Tayob emphatically asserts that: 
This henneneutical, dialogic nature of the QuMin cannot be understated, because the 
recitation, memorization, and transmission of the Qur1in was deceptive in the way it 
appeared to reproduce itself. In the sennon, then, the Qur1in resonated not only in the 
numerous quotations from it, although no doubt preachers cited the Qur1in profusely and 
drew allldnds of lessons, allegories, and analogies from its chapters and verses. But they did 
much more than recite when they did so. As they related the Qur'an to new contexts and new 
teachings, they re~ited the texts for these contexts. In sennons, preachers literally re-cited 
the Qur1in by producing, in fonn and perfonnance, their own compositions. They not only 
repeated the frrst act of revelation from Gabriel to Muhammad but continued it. The sennon 
was not simply a speech act or admonishment In terms of the nonverifiable / nonfalsifiable 
reality that Islam posited as a religion, the sennon was an occasion for divine irruption. It 
recalled and reproduced, however dimly, the divine irruption in seventh century Arabia.125 
By examining the multitude of ways in which preachers appropriate and re-cite the 
Qur'an during the sermon in response to contingent social events, Tayob concludes that 
any demarcation between the Qur'an as closed and the Qur'an as continued expansion is 
rent asunder. 126 He thereby seems to suggest that specific contexts playa decisive role in 
determining the meaning of the Qur'anic text as "the sermons constituted creative reading 











is unique in its explication of how the Qur'an comes to life and is made relevant to the 
challenges of social existence, he makes no attempt to bring into question the mediated 
understandings arising out of the process of re-citation, or to examine these 'Qur'anic' 
pronouncements in light of the fixed ethical imperative of the Qur'an. In fact, one is left 
quite uncertain with regards to whether Tayob takes seriously the recognition of a fixed 
core in the Qur'an, since he affirms the continuous play between text and context in the 
generation of meaning far more explicitly. 
Although Tayob's approach is not without its problems, it possesses several positive 
aspects that must be exploited and pushed further. The first is the tremendous emphasis 
he places upon the oral-aural nature of the Qur'an, and second, his recognition of the 
dialogic process in the generation of both meaning and praxis, which consequently 
stresses the performative nature of the Qur'an. These aspects will now be elaborated upon 
in further detail. We must once again re-visit the work of Charles Taylor in order to 
explore the relationship between the Qur'an and the dialogical self. 
Drawing extensively on Taylor's work, I have argued in the last chapter that identity is 
constructed in ethical space, that a sense of who we are is defined in terms of what is of 
ultimate importance to us. This in a way represents the relation between what is perennial 
and what is ever changing in human life. Taylor thus asserts that although humans always 
have a sense of self that situates them in ethical space, the terms that define this space, 
and that situate us within it, vary in striking fashion. 128 Obviously the way that ethical 











over the Western tradition along with Taylor. As he explains, a particular feature of the 
Western intellectual tradition has been the tendency to see the human agent as primarily a 
subject of representations: " representations, first, about the world outside; and second, 
depictions of ends desired or feared. This subject is a mono logical one". 129 Stated 
differently, Taylor explains that this view of the self, definable independently of body or 
other, represents a centre of mono logical consciousness. This view of the subject is 
strongly rejected by him and he contemptuously holds it responsible for breeding the 
various forms of methodological individualism, "including the most recent and virulent 
variant, the current vogue for rational-choice theory". 130 
Adding his voice to the likes of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Taylor calls for an escape from the "cul-de-sac of mono logical 
consciousness".131 He therefore supports the notion that the agent must be seen, not 
primarily as the locus of representations, but as engaged in practices, as a being who acts 
in and on a world. He thus distinguishes between mono logical and dialogical acts, 
arguing that from the standpoint of the old [Cartesian] epistemology, all acts were 
mono logical even when the agent coordinated his or her acts with others. 132 An 
integrated, nonindividual agent, by contrast, effects dialogical action, where this kind of 
action essentially depends on the sharing of agency constituted by a shared understanding 












Approaching the question of agency ontologically Taylor asserts that" the importance of 
dialogical action in human life shows the utter inadequacy of the mono logical subject of 
representations which emerges from the epistemological tradition". 134 Explaining further, 
he argues that we define ourselves partly in terms of what we come to accept as our 
appropriate place within dialogical actions. For example, in the case where I really 
identify myself with my deferential attitude towards a higher calling, then this 
conversational stance becomes a constituent of my identity. 
Restating this in terms of the relationship between the human agent and the Qur)an, it 
may be said that the subject becomes predisposed to the ethical teachings of the Qur'an 
through a process of meaningful dialogue, an engagement with the divine intent 
expressed in revelation, to which the believer defers and complies, ultimately giving 
expression to his or her understanding through practical action. This is a fundamental 
characteristic of the dialogical self because, as Taylor asserts, our understanding resides 
first of all in our practices. 135 This process is altogether lost to the mono logical self, the 
one who approaches the Qur'an simply as a framework of representations. Taylor is 
emphatic in arguing that representations are not the primary locus of understanding, "they 
are just islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world". 136 
To reiterate, it may be said that the way in which a person emulates and expresses the 
ontological blueprint of values embedded within the Qur'an is a result of the dialogical 
action outlined by Taylor. As he explains more explicitly: "The self neither preexists all 











interlocutor; but it arises within conversation, because this kind of dialogical action by its 
very nature marks a place for the new locator who is being inducted into it". 137 In order to 
fully grasp the dialogical process just described requires an understanding of the Qur'an 
that emphasises its oral and aural character. 
William Graham is one of the few scholars to have paid any significant attention to the 
function of the Qur'an as spoken word. He criticises the fact that the study of religious 
texts in their function as scriptures has been subordinated to the critical study of their 
earliest written forms.138 "The problem this presents is not the linkage of scripture to the 
written word, but the simplistic understanding of scripture as only the written word, only 
the physical text of the holy writ". 139 The kind of discursive violence inflicted upon the 
written word is evident even by a cursory glance at the work of postmodem theorists, 
some of which was elaborated upon earlier, but perhaps the greatest injustice inflicted 
upon the Qur'an has been to overlook its inherently dialogical nature. This can only be 
grasped by recognising the functioning of the Qur'an as spoken word. 
Graham is emphatic that scripture only becomes a useful and meaningful concept for the 
study of religion when it is understood to be a relational rather than an absolute category 
or phenomenon. 
A more adequate understanding of scripture has to include an awareness that it refers not 
simply to a text but always to a text in its relationship to an ongoing tradition, that is, in its 











In this regard Graham affirms our earlier distinction between the Qur)an as scripture and 
the Qur)an as foundational text, in the process emphasising the primary importance of the 
latter to the community of faithful. From this perspective it "refers to a living, active, 
immediate reality in people's lives rather than merely a completed, transmitted piece of 
writing" .141 Most importantly for present concerns, he strongly asserts that the most 
authoritative form of the Qur'anic text is oral and not written.142 The active role of the 
Qur'an as spoken word is a distinctive mark of the Muslim scripture and this is evident 
from its role in every day devotional life. Graham as such asserts that the written text is 
always secondary.143 This then, is the starting point for understanding the dialogical 
relationship between the Qur'an and its interlocutors, especially the role of revelation in 
the shaping of the Muslim ideal-self. 
As Taylor explains, no one acquires the languages needed for self-definition on their 
own, but are introduced to them through meaningful exchanges and that is why the 
genesis of the human mind is not "monological," not something one accomplishes on his 
or her own, but dialogical. 144 For the Muslim such meaningful exchange is effected 
through his or her reception of the oral Qur)an. Graham cites the internal evidence of the 
Qur'anic text itself to prove the originally oral-aural understanding by pointing to the 
recurring imperative "QuI!" ("Say!"), which introduces well over three hundred different 
passages, in addition to the frequently repeated verb talii, "to recite, follow,". 145 
In addition to the stylistic expression that reinforces the character of the Qur'an as the 











existential concerns of all human beings, that is, where do we come from, what is our 
purpose, and what is our final end. 146 As Searle reminded us earlier, any discourse that 
imposes or assigns certain functions also projects a certain teleology, and in the case of 
the Qur'an, this teleology is explicitly stated when addressing the above existential 
concerns. The believer, by virtue of his or her attestation to faith and submission to the 
socio-moral injunctions and directives of revelation, accepts the projected teleology of 
the Qur>an. It is therefore through this dialogical process whereby revelation addresses 
the ultimate concerns of its interlocutors that the Muslim ideal-self is constructed. In 
addition, the process powerfully conveys the communal and performative nature of the 
Qur)an as well. 
With all of this in mind, the earlier claims made by Moosa, Fischer and Abedi can now 
be adequately addressed. Simply by understanding the performative nature of the Qur)an 
and its power to effect Muslim praxis we are able to see that any claims suggesting that it 
is not founded upon, or reflective of a stable core of meaning must immediately be 
dismissed as being patently absurd. Nor is the assertion that the stability of meaning acts 
as an elimination of "the dialogue of discourses" of any substance either. First of all, not 
everyone who engages the Qur'an feels compelled to submit to its authority and neither 
does the acceptance of its authority result in a monolithic expression of its injunctions. 
This has been clearly demonstrated by Tayob in his analysis of the Friday sermon and his 
elaboration on the multiplicity of ways in which the Qur)an is re-cited. In a sense then, 
both insiders and outsiders continuously converse with the 'Divine Voice' and the 











worldview around which the community IS created. Obviously, in order for any 
community to cohere as a collective, they must be bound by that which is common 
between them. 
This point of commonality brings us directly to the major problematic aspect of Tayob's 
approach, which must also be addressed now. It concerns the erasure of any demarcation 
between the Qur'an as closed and the Qur'an as continued expansion. Even though he 
brilliantly illustrates how individual preachers re-cite the same Qur'an in a multiplicity of 
ways, he pays too little attention to the way in which the Muslim community is able to 
cohere as a group, which is a reality reflected even at a global scale. Although certain 
aspects of the petformative Qur'an may find expression in ways that are not similar or 
uniform, the majority of the performative Qur'an is received in a manner that reflects 
common understanding. This unity of purpose is effected by the common belief in the 
Qur'an's projected teleology, which in tum makes aspiring to the same goals and 
objectives possible, even if mediated by sometimes contradictory, understandings. As 
long as there are Muslims who strongly believe in God as the Transcendent Source of 
knowledge and ethics, that the purpose of existence is to fulfill the objectives set by God 
in the Qur'an, and that there will be final accountability for all actions in the afterlife, 
there will always be a community of faithful who are bound together and cohere as a 
group, in spite of their differences. Only a Qur'an clearly definable by distinctive 











The performative nature of the Qur>an is such that it is able to bring about ontic unity 
while simultaneously accommodating epistemic variance. This can only be understood 
once we are able to transcend the strictures that view the Qur>an simply as a text and 
acknowledge its status as foundational text. The Qur>anic ethical imperative, which is at 
the heart of the foundational text, is the perfect ideal towards which the committed 
believer continuously strives. In this regard, the Muslim ideal-self is not necessarily an 
ideal that is unachievable, but simply an ideal that is always under construction. This, in a 
sense, is what defines the existential struggle of the believer. 
6. Conclusion 
Current trends in society show a tremendous revival of religion in general. The same 
revival in Muslim society has been characterised by the call to return to the Qur'an. As 
such the pressing need to try and understand how the Qur>an has - and is - being received 
by Muslims must be heeded. This is exactly the task that has been undertaken in this 
chapter. 
I began by elaborating upon the early status of the Qur>an as foundational text and have 
argued for it to once again be received in a similar manner. This necessitated elaborating 
upon how such reception could be effected, giving due consideration to trends in 
contemporary philosophical discourse that are critical as well as accommodating of this 
endeavor. I have further argued that as long as the existential concerns addressed in the 











stable core around which a community is defined, in addition to a common ethical 
imperative that is continuously aspired to. 
In the conclusion that follows, I will revisit the main arguments presented in the various 
chapters and attempt to bring into perspective the re-emergence of the foundational text 
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This study has attempted to examine the way in which the philosophical discourses of 
modernity and postmodernity have impacted upon contemporary Islamic thought by 
analyzing the re-emergence of the Qur'an as foundational text. The centrality of the 
Qur'an in the Muslim imagination has always been affirmed, but the ability to translate 
firm beliefs into living practices that bridge the gap between an imagined ideal and the 
vagaries of temporal existence has always been a challenge. It is a challenge that has 
been complicated by the intertwining of opposing ideals and their projected worldviews, 
all vying for legitimacy, and therefore, a position of centrality within the sUbjective self. 
From this perspective, Islam, modernity and postmodernity all represent authentic ideals 
that stand in opposition to each other. Because Islam represents a marginal discourse in 
contemporary times, the impact of the dominant discourses of modernity and 
postmodernity have stimulated deep introspection that has resulted in a clearer 
articulation of the authentic Islamic ideal. The engagement with modernity and 
postmodernity has therefore ultimately been positive. It has provoked seeking the 
justification needed to lend legitimacy to the re-emergent status of the Qur'an as 
foundational text, in addition to interrogating the reception of the Qur'an in the pre-
modern era. 
The first chapter explored the genesis of modernity in the Western philosophical 
tradition, emphasising the paradigm shift - or epistemological break - that removed 











not effected in the Islamic context but the mercurial rise of modernist discourse with 
reason as foundational text successfully displaced other alternatives and placed it in a 
position of dominance. It was ultimately the moral and socio-political trappings of 
modernist discourse that led to its rejection and opened the way for other alternatives. 
The postmodernist alternative advocated wholesale rejection and abandonment of all 
grand narratives, thereby declaring a virulent form of anti-foundationalism that unnerved 
the believing subject, even though the major criticisms of modernity were endorsed. 
Muslim sentiment was too strongly rooted in a world view inspired by the Qur'an, which 
for postmodernists was just another grand narrative. Neither modernity nor 
post modernity was able to effect the abandonment of the Islamic world view, but served 
the positive consequence of enhancing the intellectual sophistication of Islamic discourse, 
in addition to inspiring the articulation of the Islamic position in common terms. 
By building upon the general critique of modernity and postmodernity deliberated upon 
in the first chapter, the central aim of the second chapter was to make clear the Islamic 
alternative. For the Muslim subject, Islam still served as principle and base of identity. It 
was therefore attempted to explain Islam as an ideal that conceived of authenticity in 
terms of ontological self-perception. The ontological tum reflected a deeper 
understanding of the Muslim subject because it recognised the link between the believer's 
ultimate concerns and the construction of identity. It was argued that Islamic identity, and 
therefore the Islamic concept of the ideal-self, is informed by the Qur'an, which addresses 
the believer's ultimate concerns and thereby provides a basis for human agency. 











contrasting it with images of the self emanating from the discourses of modernity and 
postmodernity. 
By extending the descriptions of the various images of the self discussed in chapter two it 
may be reasonably suggested that the Muslim self-image be referred to as the submissive 
self since it defers to the authority of the Qur)an, which is regarded as the manifestation 
of divine-presence. Modernist discourse, in contrast, valorised reason and was able to 
transcend the authority of the divine by deifying the self. As such, self-presence was 
manifested over divine-presence. Modernity's ideal self-image is therefore best referred 
to as the narcissistic self Postmodernity on the other hand - having risen from the 
discontents of modernity - pays obeisance to the limitations of the subject and 
consequently lays no claim to any ideal worthy of emulation. It denies the very 
possibility of presence altogether, thereby giving rise to the dislocated self. By relating 
the issue of presence to the question of authority over the self, the second chapter tried to 
show that divine-presence acted as a source of meaning and significance, whereas self-
presence divested all authority from an external source and places it in the hands of the 
knowing subject. The postmodernist alternative, which denied presence altogether, 
challenged the very notion of authority. 
What emerges very clearly from the above comparison is that an essential characteristic 
of the Islamic paradigm is its firm grounding in a conception of the self that strives to 
submit to the authority of the Qur)an. Stated differently, Islamic identity is best conceived 











subject strives to submit. By contrast, the dominant Western-secular paradigm - that 
serves as a conduit for the discourses of modernity and postmodernity - is currently 
suspended between the authority of the self and a growing scepticism that casts severe 
doubt over the moral capacity of reason. It is therefore from a position of newfound 
strength that the third and final chapter approached the role of the Qur'an as foundational 
text. 
In the third chapter I have argued that to assert the re-emergence of the foundational text 
in contemporary Islamic discourse, in relation to the dominant secular paradigm, is to 
recognise the reassertion of an alternate authentic ideal whose proposed teleology once 
again holds much promise. It also demonstrated that Muslims are once again turning to 
the Qur'an as a source of values and as a guide in their existential endeavors. This is very 
much akin to the way in which the nascent Muslim community had received the Qur'an, 
as a foundational text that informed the very purpose of their existence. 
This is a position that challenges the dominant narratives within Islamic discourse as 
well. Whereas the Qur'an may have indeed informed the grand narratives constructed by 
the scholars of KaIam, the Islamic philosophers, and the ~Ofi-Mystics, it was still 
expressed and conveyed in a mediated form that inadvertently compromised its ethical 
imperative. Therefore, by re-asserting the foundational text all mediated discourses are 
effectively circumvented. This exercise in retrieval has been the central occupation of 
some of the greatest minds in the Islamic tradition, including luminaries like al-Shatibi 











It was further emphasised that the Qur'an as foundational text transcends the strictures 
that view it as a scriptural text, which consequently makes little of arguments that strive 
to undermine it by pointing to the limitlessness of interpretation. The performative and 
communal nature of the Qur>an was shown to be able to effect ontic unity while 
simultaneously accommodating epistemic variance. The foundational text, it was argued, 
is what defines the existential struggle of the believer because it provides the blueprint for 
the Muslim ideal-self and therefore an immutable standard that is sought after and 
emulated immaterial of context and time. The Islamic authentic ideal is oriented towards 
an ethical ontology, which is a very important departure from the more prevalent atavistic 
posture that sought to regain the splendor of a distant past. The ideal Muslim-self thus 
looks to the future, drawing strength, motivation and ultimate meaning from the fixed 
ethical core expressed in the Qur>an, while simultaneously being inspired by its vision of 
the hereafter. 
While this study has consciously emphasised the ideal over the lived reality, it is by no 
means 'idealistic' to now suggest that Islam may in fact represent a genuine alternative to 
the dominant discourses of modernity and postmodernity. This is simply because the 
Islamic worldview is being received as a viable alternative to its prevalent secular 
counterpart. In a very recent study, Adam Seligman gives serious consideration to the 
possibility that the secularisation thesis has been wrong. 1 He consequently predicts that 
the further progress of modernity - and even postmodernity - will not be accompanied by 












This is clearly reflected in Muslim communities all over the world, especially in countries 
that have enforced the secular world view upon majority-Muslim populations. None can 
deny that the Islamic worldview is currently enjoying tremendous revival. It is 
nonetheless crucial to note that arguing in favor of, or supporting, the re-emergence of the 
Qur>an as foundational text should not be construed as an arrogant expression of Islamic 
triumphalism over the waning secular worldview. This argument is best conceived of as 
the point of departure for a sustained effort to make sense of the changing realities of a 
world in constant motion. In this regard, it is hoped that this study may be seen as a step 
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